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CALEB STRONG, CHARLES PINCKNEY, AND LUTHER MARTIN AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISES OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
 
 
An Abstract of the Thesis by 
Jason W. Yonce 
 
 
This study determines the place of surviving Framers of the Constitution from the 
American convention to the constitutional crises of the early republic.  Only seventeen of 
the Framers survived in 1819.  In 1820, that number had dwindled to thirteen.  Rather 
than playing background roles while the next generation took the reins of government of 
the early republic, many of these men were at the forefront of the major turning points of 
the early republic and their inherent constitutional questions.  For Caleb Strong of 
Massachusetts, the questions concerned the nature of the new union, whether a state 
could leave the union, and under what circumstances could the federal government 
conscript state militias during the rise of the Jeffersonian Republicans and the War of 
1812.  For Charles Pinckney, the questions were of the legality of the three-fifths 
compromise and the rights of territories to determine the legality of slavery during the 
Missouri crisis.  Luther Martin, as counsel for the State of Maryland in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, denied the existence of implied powers in the Constitution in that seminal 
case.  These events occurred from twenty-seven to thirty-three years after the 
Constitutional Convention.  Rather than being retired sages sought for their wisdom, like 
Madison and Jefferson, these Framers were still active in government and explicating the 
document they helped to draft. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis will attempt to show the influence of the Framers of the American 
Constitution in the constitutional crises of the early republic.  The bulk of popular and 
academic scholarship places the Framers in their better-known context: the drafting and 
ratification of the United States Constitution.  For most of these men, this the 1810s and 
1820s were the end of their careers or retirement.  For the subjects of this thesis, their 
lives would extend beyond the eighteenth century and they would become pivotal figures 
in their states and at the country at large.    
Before going further, it is important to establish the meaning of certain terms.  
The terms Founding Father and Framer have distinct meanings.  Who is considered a 
Founding Father has changed over the course of the term’s usage, as it has undergone 
several academic definitions.  It can apply to the signers of the Declaration of 
Independence, the Articles of Confederation, or the Constitution of 1787.1  The definition 
has been extended to major military figures and state-level politicians as well.  However, 
in attempting to shun Great Man history, some historians have extended the term to 
                                                          
     1 It is a trivial matter, but only six men signed both the Declaration and the Constitution: George 
Clymer, Benjamin Franklin, Robert Morris, George Read, Roger Sherman, and James Wilson.  Of those 
six, only Morris and Sherman signed the Articles of Confederation.  Sherman also signed the Continental 
Association. 
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include almost anyone in the Revolutionary generation and without regard for race and 
gender.  The growth and rapid popularization of multicultural histories, and British 
perspectives on the Revolutionary War, shifted the emphasis from the Founding Fathers. 
Naturally, a reaction also occurred to revive the Founding Fathers and Framers.2 
Non-political historians of the early republic avoid this controversy.  Their 
starting points are usually drawn from the realm of social history; the histories, diaries, 
wills, and other documents showing the accoutrements of the lower classes.  The best-
known example in recent time has been Laurel Thatcher Ulrich’s A Midwife’s Tale which 
unpacked the history through the eyes of a woman diarist from 1785 to 1812.  These 
histories can be taken as valuable by themselves or become part of other researched 
historical patterns.  The problem, as Ulrich notes in her introduction is that “taken alone, 
such stories tell us too much and not enough, teasing us with glimpses of intimate life, 
repelling us with a reticence we cannot decode. Yet in the broader context, and in relation 
to large themes in eighteenth-century history, they can be extraordinarily revealing.”3   
Other books focus on the politics and the emergence of American nationalism as 
well as identity (David Waldstreicher’s In The Midst of Perpetual Fetes) and even more 
conventional histories of the period can focus on the activities of nameless mobs and the 
political violence and intimidation of the pre-war period (Robert Middlekauff’s The 
                                                          
     2 The most popular book of American criticism from this period was Howard Zinn, A People’s History 
of the United States (New York: Harper and Row, 1980).  British or international perspectives on the 
Revolution include Stanley Weintraub, Iron Tears: America's Battle for Freedom, Britain's Quagmire, 
1775–1783 (New York: Free Press, 2005) and Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations: America’s Place 
in World History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006). An example of Founder revivalism is Joseph Ellis, 
Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001). 
     3 Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, A Midwife’s Tale: The Life of Martha Ballard, Based on Her Diary, 1785-
1812 (New York: Random House, 1990), 25. 
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Glorious Cause).  The books that focus on the common person’s experience of the early 
republic are vital to a holistic picture of history.  That is not in dispute.  However, there is 
still a place for the powerful and their influence on the history.  Historians have already 
tilled this ground for many Revolutionary figures.  Sans James Madison, many of the 
surviving Framers in the first quarter of the nineteenth century did not occupy national 
positions.  State-level politics and identity still held primacy as the country endured its 
growing pains into a single country and would for decades beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  Nevertheless, the actions of these men were significant as expositions of the 
constitution they helped to draft for an entire country.  They are not typically, however, 
referred to as Founders, they are Framers. 
Richard B. Morris, in 1973, confined his “Founders” to seven: Franklin, 
Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Jay, Hamilton, and Madison.  Morris loosely defined his 
criteria as charismatic leadership, staying power, and constructive statesmanship.4  
Others, like Patrick Henry or Thomas Paine, made their impacts early in the Revolution 
and without the footprint of power made by the chosen seven.  Morris probed their 
personal correspondence, to “pierce the veil of privacy.” Morris then states, “fortunately, 
in all seven cases we have enough available documentation to see them on their own 
ground and judge them on their own terms.” The amount of remaining documentation 
becomes a serious problem even among the elite group of Founders.  Figures in national 
roles – President, Chief Justice, and others – often have their personal correspondence 
stored in official government archives for posterity.  Morris’ contention that these men 
                                                          
     4 Richard B. Morris, Seven Who Shaped Our Destiny: The Founding Fathers as Revolutionaries (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1973): 1-4. 
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wielded the most influence and had the most charisma is certainly valid.  But their 
placement as the key seven figures also smacks of a choice of convenience because there 
is no paucity of material written by and about these figures. 
David Melinkoff, whose career focused extensively on the removal of archaic 
language and verbosity in twentieth century legal writing, placed the terms Founding 
Father and Framer in his 1993 legal dictionary.  Melinkoff’s definitions lack the 
stringency necessary for perfect categorization.  For Melinkoff, “often the words produce 
a mood, rather than a meaning, and slip easily into the category of clichés.”5  Melinkoff 
differentiated between Founder and Framer.  While there is considerable overlap between 
the two terms, they are different.  Where Melinkoff’s definition becomes problematic is 
that it is easy to see which Founders were Framers, certainly names like Madison and 
Hamilton come to mind.  Deciding among the other Framers who can receive the title 
Founder is far more difficult.  But neither Morris’s panegyrics nor Melinkoff’s clichés are 
satisfactory in this determination.  Similarly, when it comes to the major political events 
of the early republic, political history must be told by its actors who are, with notable 
exceptions like Franklin, gleaned from the small world of the powerful, and for this era 
the powerful are also men.  For the purposes of this thesis, the term Founder will remain 
untouched and Framer will include any of the fifty-five who attended the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787.  To exclude non-signers would be to exclude both Caleb Strong, 
called away to tend to a sick relative before signing, and Luther Martin who exited in 
protest with fellow Marylander John Francis Mercer.  This same definition satisfied Mel 
Bradford in 1982 when he biographized the fifty-five delegates.  However, Bradford 
                                                          
     5 David Melinkoff, Dictionary of American Legal Usage (Eagan, MN: West Group, 1993), 256. 
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restricted the length of the biographical entries not solely on available source material but 
also his perception of each delegate’s contribution.  While scarce source material can 
doom many attempts at biography, Bradford used the example of Delaware’s Jacob 
Broom, it is the contention of this text that these three Framers have been underestimated 
in their contribution not only at the Convention but at explaining the Constitution in the 
early nineteenth century.6  
As Antonio Gramsci posited, the history of the ruling class is the history of the 
country. They unified to form it.  The stories of those who existed outside the political 
society of the early republic are bound to the stories attached to the three Framers at the 
subject of this text.  The histories of those outside the political society are inextricably 
bound in those of the powerful.7  As these groups unite and interact with political society 
their histories are revealed as well.  Any tension between historians of subaltern peoples 
and of the powerful, like the Founding Fathers, is unnecessary and fallacious.  Historians 
are aware of the effects of the less powerful on government and indeed that history in the 
broadest strokes cannot always be told from the perspective of political history.  Here, 
however, both are confronted.  The three Framers here are the largely forgotten political 
figures and their relevance is precisely because this is the founding, and development, of 
a new political structure with only minimal precedent in its own time.8 
                                                          
     6 Mel Bradford, Founding Fathers (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1982), xx. 
     7 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell 
Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 44-55 and 206-9. 
       9 Maurice Mandelbaum, The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1977), 157-60. 
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The bulk of this thesis will be on the surviving Framers and key constitutional 
crises from 1803-1821.  By 1820, only thirteen of the original Framers plus Adams, 
Jefferson, Gallatin, Jay, and Monroe remained.  However, the scope of this thesis will 
only focus on the Framers.  Harlow Giles Unger wrote an estimable biography of James 
Monroe titled The Last Founding Father.  The very young Monroe was an early Virginia 
delegate to the Confederation Congress but was not a Framer.  Monroe’s friend, James 
Madison, survived him by five years.  He is, arguably, the last of the Framers and has his 
later life, and clashes with nullifiers over his legacy, has been examined in detail in Drew 
McCoy’s The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and The Republican Legacy.  The year 
1849 seems to be another terminal year for the founding generation.  The last wives of the 
Framers, Dolly Madison and Anne Gerry, died in that year as did the eighty-eight year 
old Albert Gallatin. 
 Not all Framers had much to say about the politics of the 1820s.  The period in 
question here is 1803-1821, from the beginning of the War of 1812 until the close of the 
Missouri crisis.  The youngest Framer, Jonathan Dayton, was twenty-seven at the time 
and lived until 1824 when he died at the age of sixty-four.  This period is the twilight of 
the founding generation.  This text’s purpose is to reclaim the work of three lesser known 
Framers and to show their influence in the politics of the early republic.  This is a domain 
usually occupied by only Adams, Jefferson, and Madison.  However,  although most of 
the Framers had already died, a handful of others were left to provide exegesis of the 
document they had drafted.  But just as there are competing and diametrically opposed 
interpretations of the Constitution in the present, there were similar conflicts among its 
authors. Some offered nothing at all.   
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 William Few, delegate from Georgia, lived in New York before the War of 1812.  
Few’s surviving records are scant.  His autobiography, presumably written sometime in 
the late 1810s and published in 1881 gives few clues to his opinions.9  Few spoke mostly 
of the corruption of New York politics and banking rather than of the state of national 
affairs.  Though he mentioned the War of 1812 in passing, he did not consider in his old 
age that readers of his musings would care much of his opinions of the Constitutional 
Convention.  Much of this is the result of his congressional service; he missed much of 
the proceedings of the convention.  Few’s obituary mentions him as a member of the 
convention but grants his war-time activities as a leading officer of the Revolution greater 
weight than his minimal contributions as a Framer.  He was re-interred in 1971 in 
Augusta, Georgia.10  
Similarly, this thesis will pay little attention to Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey 
although he survived until 1824.  Dayton replaced his father, Elias Dayton, and became 
the youngest member of the Constitutional Convention at age twenty-seven.  Dayton 
spoke infrequently at the convention and left little insight to his thoughts on government.  
Mel Bradford’s brief biographical sketch hinted at Dayton’s “questionable schemes.” 
Indeed, Dayton only narrowly avoided charges of treason colluding with Aaron Burr’s 
military expedition and was a business partner of Thomas Gibbons and political opponent 
                                                          
     9 Gerald J. Smith, “William Few Jr.” New Georgia Encyclopedia, last modified June 8, 2017, accessed 
March 5, 2018, http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/william-few-jr-1748-
1828. 
     10 “Re-burial Asked After 143 Years,” New York Times, December 5, 1971, accessed February 28, 
2018, http://www.nytimes.com/1971/12/05/archives/reburial-asked-after-143-years-georgia-hopes-to-
honor-a-hero-of-the.html. 
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of Aaron Ogden of the famous Gibbons v. Ogden, adjudicated six months before 
Dayton’s death while hosting the Marquis de Lafayette in 1824.11 
 Charles Beard took an even less favorable view of Dayton in his seminal work on 
the economic interests of the Founders.  Dayton was a rabid land speculator and spent 
more of his later life involved in that field than in politics.12  Dayton was a committed 
Federalist, although approved he of Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase in 1803.  Both 
Dayton and Pierce Butler of South Carolina offered their defenses of the treaty with 
France and Spain, although only Dayton’s were recorded in the Annals.  Dayton’s initial 
election to the House of Representatives in 1790 was centered on personalities, not 
politics, a possibility that many in the convention had feared.  Ironically, Dayton was 
portrayed as an enemy to the constitution he helped to draft. The raucous, sham election 
elicited comment from James Madison who lamented it was of a “very singular 
manner.”13  Dayton served a term as Speaker of the House until his election to the Senate 
by the New Jersey legislature. 
                                                          
     11 Mel Bradford, Founding Fathers, 61-3.  Christian R. Esh “The Sacred Cause of State Rights: Theories 
of Union and Sovereignty in the Antebellum North” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Maryland, 2006), 205. 
     12 Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: 
MacMillan, 1913), 85-6. 
     13 The best expositor of early New Jersey politics, cited by Bradford and numerous others, was the late 
Richard P. McCormick (1916-2006) of Rutgers University.  See Richard P. McCormick, “New Jersey’s 
First Congressional Election, 1789: A Case Study in Political Skullduggery,” William and Mary Quarterly 
6, no. 2 (April 1949), 237-50 and Richard P. McCormick, “Experiment in Independence: New Jersey in the 
Critical Period, 1781-1790” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1948). The quote is from a letter 
from Madison to Washington written March 19, 1789.  The use of the word “singular” probably means 
uniqueness since New Jersey law had never stipulated a closing date for the polls.  As a result, polling 
places remained opened for months and corruption between the warring regional factions prevailed.  
Ultimately, Dayton and the West Jersey Junto were successful.  A re-printing of the letter with substantial 
context can be found “To George Washington from James Madison, 19 March 1789,” Founders Online, 
National Archives, accessed December 21, 2017, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-
01-02-0316. 
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 By 1802, all of New Jersey’s representatives in the House were Democratic-
Republicans.  Aaron Ogden, who had served alongside Dayton, lost his seat in the Senate 
and in 1804 Dayton was ousted by blacksmith Aaron Kitchell.  Dayton never served in 
another political post.  When the Eighteenth Congress convened in 1824, more fanfare 
arose from Lafayette’s visit than Dayton’s death.  The Annals give way to the much less 
detailed Register of Debates but there is no mention of Dayton’s death in December 
1824.14   
 However, all Framers, without regard to their impact, had an interest in their 
legacies. The Framers were equally preoccupied with their sectional and personal 
interests as well as the awareness of their place in this moment of history.  A legacy 
becomes an interesting rhetorical tool here.  Take, for instance, the slavery interests of 
Framers like Hugh Williamson and John Rutledge who, bluntly, held the ratification 
hostage until assurances that the new document would leave southern slavery 
undisturbed.  Had this resulted in the failure to move past the failings of the 
Confederation, the men would have the legacy, within their own times, as defenders of 
southern economic interests and tradition.  Compromise, with gritted teeth, ruled the 
convention and slavery remained for another several decades.  However, the other 
Framers, particularly Rufus King and Charles Pinckney, could turn those same 
compromises into faults.  Instead of a legacy of compromise one has the legacy of 
holding national unity hostage for sectional, and personal, interests.   
                                                          
     14 The best bibliography of material on Dayton, much of which is referenced here, is collected in the 
regrettably forgotten The Speakers of the U.S. House of Representatives. See Donald R. Kennon, The 
Speakers of the U.S. House of Representatives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 20-25. 
10 
 
 The terms Founding Father or Framer are terms of lionization.  In some manner, it 
is a concern of heritage rather than history.  No one wants their heritage to include 
persons whose actions, in light of present morality, are tainted with oppression and self-
interest.  However, avoiding the fallacy of presentism, the forefather can be forgiven as a 
product of his own time and ineligible for judgement based on contemporary standards.  
Perhaps it is no surprise that historian Richard Morris attempted to restrict the term 
Founding Father to only seven key figures.   
 Legacies are an issue of historical interpretation and national memory.  Both are 
subject to popular whims; the former of paradigms and the latter with changing 
mentalities and morality.  As Peter Kosso has noted, historians run the risk of imposing 
their own ideas and sensibilities on the past.15  However, it is those of us in the present 
who determine a prominent figure’s, a movement’s, or even a country’s legacy.  Legacies 
are both value judgements and historical interpretation.  Where one begins and the other 
ends is murky. 
 Indeed, the balance between what one intended their legacies to be and how the 
living in the present interpret them is an endless give and take for historians.  Legacies 
are not objective histories.  However, the men in question here – Caleb Strong, Charles 
Pinckney, and Luther Martin – have tenuous legacies as forgotten figures in the present.  
One should avoid lionizing them simply because they were figures in the founding of the 
United States but, similarly, a certain objective justice must be done to them as objects of 
the study of history.  As Leopold von Ranke believed, total objectivity is as bad as total 
                                                          
     15 Peter Kosso “The Logical Fallacies of Historians,” in A Companion to the Philosophy of History and 
Historiography, ed. Alviezer Tucker (Wiley-Blackwell: West Sussex, 2011): 262-73. 
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subjectivity; one must not lose the human connection with our subjects.  Similarly, 
Maurice Mandelbaum stated that objectivity provided no useful test for falsehood and 
was not necessary although impartiality was.16  
 There is an unavoidable subjectivity when discussing the Framers and how their 
historical legacy should be defined.  While most of these competing claims on their 
legacy can be justified through accepted evidence and research methods, each person will 
have their own biases.  Here, the rare intersection of history and neuroscience appears: 
one cannot make sense of information without some interpretive scheme through which 
to interpret it.  The absence of a scheme is as risky as a fixed one.  This thesis will not 
attempt to establish a legacy for these men; however, each potential reader can come 
away with his or her own interpretation.  There was no state of ignorance entering into 
this project.  The goal is simply to demonstrate that these elder Framers still held some 
authority in the exposition of the Constitution they helped to draft in their respective 
constitutional crises.  For Strong, this was the threats of New England secession and the 
rights a state had over its militia; for Pinckney, the rights of a state to be a slave state and 
count slaves in its representation in government; and for Martin, it was the basis of 
implied powers in McCulloch v. Maryland.  Nothing more in the way of collective 
legacies of the Founders, or the individual legacies of the three men studied here, have 
been unpacked for this analysis.  Though unintentional, each represents a specific region 
of the young country and the constitutional questions that those regions faced. 
                                                          
     16  Paul Newall, “Historiographic Objectivity” in A Companion to the Philosophy of History and 
Historiography, ed. Alviezer Tucker (Wiley-Blackwell: West Sussex, 2011): 172-80. 
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 Considering a Founding Father or Framer “forgotten” appears to be a prickly 
matter for research in the present.  The three Framers in question in thesis have gone 
without serious consideration in the literature for decades or longer.  However, the 
broader topics of this thesis, are not quite as bereft of source material. 
 The sources for this thesis extend from the broader topics to the narrower, 
biographical ones.  The United States Constitutional Convention has been catalogued in 
various compendia, although Max Farrand’s four-volume The Records of the Federal 
Convention remains the most frequently cited source.  Farrand drew from all the note 
takers at the convention as well as saving much of the correspondence during the summer 
of 1787.  James Madison’s notes provide the bulk of what is known from the convention.  
The most serious textual analysis of Madison’s notes has been Mary Sarah Bilder’s 2015 
book Madison’s Hand: Revising the Constitutional Convention. Bilder’s analysis of 
Madison’s notes, omissions, and later changes are worth examining in light of Farrand’s 
work.  For state-level conventions, Jonathan Elliott’s equally exhaustive five-volume 
collection in 1898 collects the notes of ratification debates in a single compendium.  Two 
earlier works on state ratification debates – Debates Which Arose in the House of 
Representatives of South Carolina (1831) and Hugh Blair Grigsby’s History of the 
Virginia Federal Convention (1855) are worth perusing as well.17 
Biographies and essays on the early republic regularly involve James Madison, 
Thomas Jefferson, John Jay, John Adams, and other towering figures of the 
                                                          
     17 Elliot’s debates have limitations.  In the preface of Debates Which Arose in the House of 
Representatives of South Carolina, this is mentioned.  The text is meant to add what Elliot omitted.  
Similarly, Elliot’s treatment of New Hampshire’s ratification is lacking.  John P Kaminski’s multivolume 
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution is a more thorough, contemporary source 
with an entire volume (no. 28) dedicated to New Hampshire. 
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Revolutionary generation.  Madison, in particular, has received plenty of well-deserved 
attention for his conflicts with John C. Calhoun in the waning days of his second 
administration and their later battles over nullification and the legacy of the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798.  Madison and Jefferson’s protests of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts have influenced interpretations of their actions ranging from controversial, 
but innocuous to radical and subversive. 
 Where do the lesser known figures of the convention fit into the early republic?  
Where is the room in this narrative for the Pinckneys, John Lansing, Caleb Strong, and 
Luther Martin?  This is a matter of narrative framing.  Most histories do not neglect to 
mention these men in some manner or another.  One cannot recount the history of 
McCulloch v. Maryland without Luther Martin.  Rufus King’s name appears anecdotally 
in pivotal moments such as the Missouri Compromise and the contentious 1824 election.   
 However, these histories relegate lesser-known Framers to the background while 
the newer generation of politicians occupy the foreground.  Perhaps this is necessary 
since none of these men, save perhaps Madison and Monroe, occupied prominent 
positions nationally.  However, it is lost on the casual reader that these random names are 
of figures present at the Constitutional Convention.  Histories of the early republic’s 
constitutional crises only offer passing mention of them.  This omission robs these figures 
of their due weight in history. 
 The due weight of these figures is based on their place in the arc of historical 
events which blended state-level conflicts into a broader, national conflict. Their 
importance has been undercut because treatments of Framers as a group centers only on 
the Constitutional Convention.  The failure to mention them as Framers in later contexts 
14 
 
like the War of 1812 or the Missouri crisis robs them of the weight of their words in 
matters of constitutional interpretation.  The younger generation of the early republic and 
their contemporaries knew that these men were members of the convention.  Their later 
biographical sketches attest to their work at the convention as some of their most 
important.   
 Strong’s state and regional issues wove neatly into Pinckney’s similar battles over 
the same issue during the Missouri crisis.  Indeed, even Strong’s actions toward Maine 
exacerbated that same crisis.  In Luther Martin’s case, the very notion of enumerated and 
implied constitutional powers came into question.  There were two questions at stake.  
The first, on the constitutionality of the bank, would grow into prominence in the coming 
decade during the ascendance of Andrew Jackson.  The second question, whether or not 
implied powers could be derived from the young constitution, set the stage for decades of 
constitutional interpretation.  Martin and John Marshall acted as one another’s foils.   
 Yet these lesser-known Framers should not necessarily be niche figures in the 
realm of regional, state, or constitutional histories.  Granted, with enough patience, one 
can trace many degrees of connection between any single individual in the early republic 
to broader historical patterns.  However, as stated, these men were known in their time.  
Governors, legislators, and attorneys general are not small actors even in the present.  
What has arguably occurred is that time and prioritization of major national figures has 
simply reduced attention to these figures.  Present mentalities, rather than real historical 
experiences, have dictated the attention shown to these men. 
Defining this generational break is not simple and even tracing biennial medians 
of the birth years of each member of the House and Senate from 1790 to 1824 would be 
15 
 
unlikely to yield a single point of demarcation in which a generational torch was passed.  
In 1790, the median birth year of a U.S. Senator was 1745.  In 1824, this median year 
shifted to 1776.  That a later Congress would be populated with men of later birth years is 
stating the obvious, but it is critical to understand the differences between these two 
groups.  The men of the Early Republic, the generation born in 1776 came of age in a far 
different milieu than their fathers.  Many of them grew into adulthood during the Virginia 
and Kentucky Resolutions.  A different war with Britain than that of their fathers shaped 
their mindsets.  The whole geography of the United States and its international 
relationships had changed.  France had undergone its Revolution and Napoleon’s rise.  
The disparate Dutch Low Countries discarded their confederation and unified into the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815.  Spain’s relationship Bourbon France had fractured 
as well.  Europe’s North and South American colonies had begun revolting.   
 By 1820, the thirteen survivors of the Constitutional Convention had the 
privileged position of seeing these shifts from the perspective of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.  Luther Martin, a veteran attorney general of Maryland and celebrity 
lawyer, was a member of this dwindling club, although his involvement in the 
Constitutional Convention was often on the receiving end of scorn and even mockery 
from his peers.  Any new treatment of Luther Martin requires an overlook of the 
scholarship and material available.  This is regrettably limited and in need of greater 
work.  Most bibliographies of works on Martin have remained uniform since 1970.  
Much of this work has been on Martin’s career as an attorney, his work as counsel during 
the trials of Samuel Chase and Aaron Burr, his defiance at the convention, and his 
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reputation for public intoxication.  McCulloch and Martin’s influence on later prominent 
figures is an afterthought if mentioned at all. 
 Primary source material on Martin is regrettably limited.  Unlike many of his 
convention peers, Martin did not appear to leave behind an archive of papers and letters.18  
There are a few possibilities here.  Perhaps Martin never thought to do so or kept his 
thoughts bound up in his encyclopedic mind.  Martin had no immediate heirs at the time 
of his death with the exception of a possible grandson.  The four to five years between 
Martin’s stroke and his death at Aaron Burr’s New York home is a long period during 
which any papers could have been lost or destroyed. Martin worked as Burr’s counsel.  
Assuming in good faith the valiant efforts of past writers on Martin, few as they have 
been, it seems likely that these papers, if extant, would have surfaced by the present day. 
 Luther Martin did leave a handful of published writings.  His 1802 autobiography, 
Modern Gratitude, is the only source of information on his early life.19 His combined 
writings addressed to the Constitutional Convention and the Maryland House of 
Delegates’ ratification debates were published as The Genuine Information.  Record of 
Martin’s words exists in Madison’s notes on the convention and has been passed down 
through the estimable scholarship of Max Farrand and others.  However, much of 
Martin’s initial speechmaking was unrecorded by Madison.  This is perhaps one of the 
biggest losses on any major figure of the convention.  Martin was certainly verbose, but 
                                                          
     18 Interestingly, even Martin’s contemporaries including his co-counsel in McCulloch, Francis 
Hopkinson, did not mention Martin in their surviving correspondence or even McCulloch in the Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania’s archives of Hopkinson’s letters and papers.   
     19 Clarkson and Jett used Modern Gratitude as the basis for their chapters on Martin’s early life filling in 
descriptive detail with contemporaneous sources on colonial and post-Revolutionary New Jersey. See Paul 
S. Clarkson and N. Samuel Jett, Luther Martin of Maryland (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 325.  
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he did not monopolize the convention any worse than Gouverneur Morris or other 
statesmen present. 
 Some of Martin’s letters have survived.  Most involve matters of legal minutiae 
and property transfers.  Others were to a potential suitor after being widowed in 1796.  
One series of exchanges that have drawn the interest of biographers were his scathing 
remarks, some of which were published, toward Thomas Jefferson for slandering 
Martin’s father-in-law, Joseph Cresap.20  Jefferson seemed more bewildered by the 
matter than anything although Martin took this as a matter of family honor.21 
 The most interesting source appearing in most bibliographies on Martin is a brief 
biographical treatment from the Maryland Historical Society in 1887, Luther Martin: The 
Federal Bull-Dog written by a well-known journalist for his time, Henry Goddard.22 
Goddard was a Civil War veteran and moderate Republican.  Goddard claimed that his 
information was drawn from the famous Supreme Court and southern jurist, John 
Archibald Campbell.  Campbell drew his knowledge of Martin from Roger Taney.23  
Campbell knew Taney well and Taney was a protégé and successor of Martin’s in 
Maryland.  Campbell also claimed John Quincy Adams as a source, which is slightly 
more problematic.  However, there is no indication in the text which piece of information 
                                                          
     20 Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on the State of Virginia,” in Thomas Jefferson: Writings, ed. Merrill D. 
Peterson (New York: Penguin, 1984), 188. 
     21 Thomas Jefferson to Peregrine Fitzhugh, June 4, 1797, in Founders Online, accessed February 24, 
2018, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-29-02-0328.  Thomas Jefferson to Mann Page, 
January 2, 1798, in the Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress, accessed February 24, 2018, 
https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib008931/. Luther Martin to Thomas Jefferson, June 24, 1797, in Founders 
Online, accessed February 24, 2018, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-29-02-0356. 
     22 Carol Bundy, “Memoirs of a Reasonable Union Man,” H-Civil War, accessed September 24, 2017, 
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=32766. 
     23 Taney’s own autobiography is a source of information on Martin. See Samuel Tyler, Memoir of Roger 
Brooke Taney (Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., 1872) and William L. Reynolds II, “Luther Martin, 
Maryland and the Constitution,” Maryland Law Review 47, no. 1 (1987), 292. 
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came from which source and Campbell’s recollection was so far removed from the 
people and events in question that it might have been impossible to know the original 
source.   
 Federal Bull-Dog repeats a problematic story about Luther Martin that William 
Giles supposedly received from John Quincy Adams.  The story, often repeated, was 
about Martin’s behavior during initial arguments during Fletcher v. Peck during which 
the attorney was so intoxicated that deliberations were canceled until he sobered.  Legal 
scholar William Reynolds offered a historiographical approach to the story in his 1987 
essay on Martin in which he concurred with Clarkson and Jett that there were no 
contemporary sources for the story.24  John Quincy Adams was in Russia at the time of 
Fletcher.  Martin’s heavy drinking began after his wife and daughters’ premature deaths.  
William Branch Giles was a Jefferson supporter and had supported Samuel Chase’s 
impeachment from the Supreme Court.  Chase’s friend, and lawyer in the case, was 
Luther Martin. 
 Because so much material from later articles and books was derived from Federal 
Bull-dog, these seemingly anecdotal asides are important.  This was an interview relating 
second hand accounts of a popular Marylander.  It was not sound textual analysis.  As 
will be seen later, surviving letters do not point to a man sickly and penniless no more 
than Bull-dog could, or should have, lead readers into an accurate portrayal of a loutish 
legal genius. 
 Aside from the aforementioned Reynolds, other essays covering Luther Martin 
include Everett Obrecht’s 1932 essay “The Influence of Luther Martin in the Making of 
                                                          
     24William P Reynolds II, “Luther Martin, Maryland and the Constitution,” Maryland Law Review 47, 
no.1 (1987), 316-7.  Clarkson and Jett, Luther Martin of Maryland, 284. 
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the Constitution of the United States.” Obrecht cited Goddard’s essay as well as Ashley 
Gould’s entry on Martin in Great American Lawyers in 1907.25 Other information is built 
around stock biographical information Martin using primary and secondary source 
material from and about John Marshall, Aaron Burr, Roger Taney, and the work of 
Farrand and Charles Warren on Constitutional History.  
 Philip Crowl continued, somewhat in the Beardian tradition in his work on 
Maryland Anti-Federalists.  His work remains standard material in studies on Maryland 
and on the few ever done on Martin.26 Crowl is most frequently cited in Forrest 
McDonald’s seminal reconsideration of Beard’s thesis in We the People.  Beard, Crowl, 
and McDonald did not necessarily reach differing conclusions on Martin and his Anti-
Federalist contemporaries in Maryland although, naturally, McDonald differed from 
Beard on who the economic beneficiaries of Maryland’s ratification would be.27 
 The first serious biography of Luther Martin was R. Samuel Jett and Paul 
Clarkson’s Luther Martin of Maryland.  Clarkson and Jett were legal scholars like 
Reynolds.  Indeed, much of the work on Martin has been the product of non-historians.  
The biography relies on the same source material that has been uniform throughout much 
scholarship on Martin.  Similar to Obrecht, Clarkson and Jett build their history of Martin 
using contemporaneous sources and other scholarship that would give some the reader 
some notion of Martin’s living conditions and social milieu at different points in his life.  
                                                          
     25 Ashley M. Gould, “Luther Martin,” in Great American Lawyers, ed. William D. Lewis (Philadelphia: 
John C. Winston Co, 1907), 5. 
     26 Philip A. Crowl, “Anti-Federalism in Maryland, 1787-1788,” William and Mary Quarterly 4, no. 4 
(October 1947), 446-69. 
     27 Forrest McDonald, We The People: the Economic Origins of the Constitution (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1958), 148-63. From McDonald’s perspective, Martin and other opponents to ratification 
stood more to gain financially from the failure to ratify than the Constitution’s supporters did from 
ratification. Also see Forrest McDonald, Novo Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 43-4 on Martin’s financial speculation. 
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The book devotes a large portion to Martin at the convention and his famous trials with 
the exception of McCulloch, which gets very little exposition at all.  The best scholarship 
on McCulloch has been the life work of Mark Killenbeck.28 Even in Killenbeck’s work, 
Luther Martin is a present but not well-developed.  This has been a longstanding problem 
with Martin’s presence in historical settings including trials in which he was an essential 
figure.  He is too frequently a supporting character in narrative treatments when he 
should be a primary one. 
 In the last forty-five years treatment of Martin has been sporadic.  Gore Vidal’s 
1973 novel Burr, the first novel in the Narrative of Empire series, reproduces Luther 
Martin using a fictional memoir of Aaron Burr.29  Martin received small revivals in the 
1980s and 1990s. He was held in high esteem by conservative scholars.  Mel Bradford 
gave Martin seven pages and an accessible bibliography in his 1981 Founding Fathers.30  
Martin had a small mention in judiciary testimony during Justice William Rehnquist’s 
1986 confirmation hearings as Chief Justice and in Rehnquist’s own 1999 history of the 
Chase impeachment, Grand Inquests.31  
 Lastly, a second biography of Martin, Forgotten Founder, Drunken Prophet was 
published in 2008 by conservative writer and novelist, Bill Kauffman.  This is not a work 
of professional history but a political biography written by a neo-Agrarian and 
                                                          
     28 Mark R. Killenbeck, M’Culloch v. Maryland: Securing a Nation (Lawrence: University of Kansas 
Press, 2006). 
     29 Gore Vidal, Burr: A Novel (New York: Random House, 1973). 
     30 Mel Bradford, Founding Fathers, 110-7. 
     31 Consideration of William Rehnquist to be Chief Justice of the United States, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 
September 1986. See also: William Rehnquist, Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments of Justice 
Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson (New York: Harper Perennial, 1999). 
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correspondent of Gore Vidal.  Nevertheless, Kauffman is no blind partisan and his work 
cites almost every title in Martin’s uniform bibliography.32 
Two centuries following Caleb Strong’s death a substantive biography has never 
been written.  Two sources serve as the best recounting of Strong’s early life:  Henry 
Cabot Lodge’s A Memoir of Caleb Strong published in 1879 and Alden Bradford’s 
Biography of Caleb Strong published the year after Strong’s death in 1820.  Lodge leans 
toward a more hagiographic account of Strong’s Puritan ancestry but shows some signs 
of rigorous research in attempting to reconstruct Strong’s early legal career.  Strong is, 
according to Lodge, remarkably absent from lists and joint letters with his peers on the 
Massachusetts Bar, including letters expressing revolutionary sentiments.33 
Bradford begins his Biography with a much more sensitive and historiographical 
treatment of the Revolutionary generation.  Bradford is given to much more staid and 
calmer eulogizing.  Bradford, anticipating two centuries worth of future research 
problems, laments the break between the fighting men of the Revolution and the patriots 
who occupied governmental and administrative positions during the war.  Bradford might 
well have been attempting to rescue Strong’s reputation following his actions (and 
inactions) in the War of 1812 by reconnecting Strong to his role in the Revolutionary 
War and the Constitutional Convention.34 
                                                          
     32 Bill Kauffman, Forgotten Founder, Drunken Prophet: The Life of Luther Martin (Wilmington, DE: 
ISI Books, November 2008). 
     33 Henry Cabot Lodge, A Memoir of Caleb Strong, United States Senator and Governor of 
Massachusetts, 1745-1818 (Cambridge: John Wilson and Son, 1879), 6-7.   
     34 Alden Bradford, A Biography of Caleb Strong Several Years Governor of the State of Massachusetts 
(Boston: West, Richardson, and Lord, 1820), 3-6.  Retired Massachusetts Court of Appeals Justice Kenneth 
Laurence wrote his undergraduate thesis at Harvard on Caleb Strong.  Harvard has the only copies and 
logistical difficulties prevented its review for this thesis.  See Kenneth Laurence, “The Political Career of 
Caleb Strong, 1745-1819” (A.B. thesis, Harvard University, 1958).   
22 
 
Massachusetts politics in the late eighteenth century was dominated by a group of 
northern Massachusetts politicians known as the Essex Junto.  These men stood in 
opposition to the dominant Adams political family and had a tenuous relationship with 
Caleb Strong.  The best-known research done on Massachusetts’ Essex Junto was Charles 
Raymond Brown’s 1913 dissertation “The Northern Confederacy According to the Plans 
of the “Essex Junto” 1796-1814.”  The writing style is very dated by contemporary 
standards and places Caleb Strong in the Junto, which is questionable.  Brown cites 
contemporaneous literature on the Junto that derided the entire notion of its existence as a 
popular political myth.  Equally scarce is research into the proposed northern 
confederacy.  Some Abbeville Institute commentators in the present decry this as a near-
deliberate omission on the part of historians; however, the failure for the confederacy to 
materialize, and the lack of broad support do not really make the matter especially 
interesting in relation to bigger contemporaneous topics like the Louisiana Purchase.  
Nevertheless, the northern confederacy is worth consideration and was best formed in 
Kevin Gannon’s “Escaping "Mr. Jefferson's Plan of Destruction": New England 
Federalists and the Idea of a Northern Confederacy, 1803-1804.”  Gannon is a specialist 
in states’ rights and secession.   
 The 1803-4 secession attempt has received less attention than the Hartford 
Convention.   Theodore Lyman published some sparse notes from the convention shortly 
afterward, the Short Account of the Hartford Convention.  James M. Banner published the 
best-known book about Hartford To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the 
Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789-1815 in 1970.  Banner’s treatment is 
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thorough, but it is clear in the introduction that he only viewed these incidents as the 
growing pains of a new republic.  
Charles Pinckney has suffered from similar neglect in the present although this 
was not always the case.  The exception has been Marty Matthews short biography 
Forgotten Founder: The Life and Times of Charles Pinckney in 2004.  Interest in 
Pinckney’s draft of the Constitution occasionally arose.  The best source, Charles Nott’s 
1908 Mystery of the Pinckney Draught, makes this case.  Max Farrand collected some of 
Pinckney’s speeches although the South Carolina ratification convention notes were 
published separately in 1833.  Pinckney’s cousin, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, also had 
an impressive career including a run at the Vice Presidency with John Adams in 1800.  
The University of South Carolina and the University of Virginia contain the biggest 
repositories of Pinckney’s writing and correspondence.   
 Pinckney’s fondness in his 1820 House speech for Swiss lawyer and political 
theorist Emer de Vattel is also worth noting.  Vattel’s influence on the Framers has not 
been as well explored as English philosophers.  Vattel barely received three brief 
mentions in Alison LaCroix’s Ideological Origins of American Federalism, but fared 
much better in Forrest McDonald’s Novus Ordo Seclorum in 1985.  The occasional 
mention of Swiss federalism as an example of a possible form of government is owed 
largely to Vattel’s influence.35  Vattel’s 1758 The Law of Nations is a neglected classic.  
Pinckney cited Vattel twice during his 1820 speech.  Pinckney’s knowledge of Vattel, his 
eloquence, and audacity at the Convention and in 1820 speak to his seriousness as a 
                                                          
     35 See James H. Hutson, The Sister Republics: Switzerland and the United States from 1776 to the 
Present (Washington: Library of Congress, 1991), 27.  Luther Martin was also an admirer of the Swiss 
model. 
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Framer even if his nomination to the Convention was primarily a consequence of his 
class and lineage. 
Broader histories of places and events have tended to feature these Framers 
although it is worth considering them individually and their roles inside these events.  
They were informed actors directly involved in the formation of the United States’ legal 
foundation and in the positions to apply them and interpret them for a newer generation 
of politicians.  They cannot, by virtue of their membership at the Constitutional 
Convention, be secondary actors.  Particularly in the cases of Luther Martin and Caleb 
Strong, their intellects and abilities made them consistently re-elected figures in their 
home states.  In Martin’s case, even when out of office, he was an eagerly sought lawyer 
in private practice and mentor.  Lack of regard for these men in the present does not 
equate with a lack of regard in their own time.   
 A similar treatment of historical figures occurs with even those still alive.  Barry 
Goldwater’s dubious achievement in most history textbooks is his loss in the 1964 
presidential election against Lyndon Johnson.  It disregards his later career in the Senate, 
his clashes with 1980s Republican Party ideology, his television interviews in his 
retirement where his opinions were sought on weighty social issues of the early 1990s.  
Other figures from the last half century as far flung as Birch Bayh, Jimmy Carter, Henry 
Kissinger, and Billy Graham are sought for their input and expertise on present issues 
even though public knowledge of their past significance is limited to a handful of key 
events.  Public knowledge of Caleb Strong, Charles Pinckney, and Luther Martin has 
wanted despite attempts by Mel Bradford and many others to treat the Framers and 
Founders collectively.  They are now the titular “forgotten” Founders.   
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 Accepting this progression as a reality of historical knowledge, one can attempt to 
conserve information and form references for future research and reading.  Similarly, 
articles and books of interest to this subject merit the same conservation to avoid making 
celebrities out of particular researchers.  The loss of information and public knowledge 
has too frequently been a test of one’s relevance in their fields just as it has been a test of 
a Founding Father’s relevance to the Constitutional Convention and the politics of the 
early republic.  This error should have the weight of a fallacy, but it is sidestepped as a 
foregone conclusion.  On that premise, this thesis will attempt to restore three of the 
forgotten.  
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CHAPTER II  
 
 
CALEB STRONG AND THE STRENGTH OF UNION 
 
 
The name Caleb Strong has a literary sense to it.  If one was writing a protagonist 
who was a scrupulous, eighteenth century Congregationalist stalwart you could not have 
chosen a better name.  “Strong” has its more obvious connotations and Caleb, derived 
from Hebrew means “dog” or, to appropriate a more endearing canine trait, “faithful.”  
For Massachusetts Federalists – leaders in their national political organization – Caleb 
Strong represented an uncontroversial, old-fashioned traditionalist.  Strong was of rural 
Massachusetts rather than the highly commercialized coastal areas of Boston.  He was an 
easy figure around which a largely fractured state party could rally during elections 
because of his gift for reconciliation with political opponents and for being seemingly 
above the fray of Federalist factionalism.1  When one considers that early Massachusetts 
elections were held annually, a tradition that was descended from the earliest days of the 
colony, Bay Staters’ fondness for Strong becomes all the more striking. 
The Strong family had been a fixture in Massachusetts since the early days of the 
colony.  Strong’s ancestors ultimately settled in Northampton in western Massachusetts.  
Strong would demonstrate an acute awareness of the political divide between coastal and 
                                                          
     1 One story in Alden Bradford’s biography has Strong stopping a post-election victory parade to break 
formation at Samuel Adams’ house to shake his hand as a gesture of goodwill. 
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western Bay Staters during his long tenure in state politics in the nineteenth century.  This 
colonial milieu placed Strong and his ancestors not only in the world of Puritanism but in 
the First Great Awakening sharing Northampton with another famous resident, Jonathan 
Edwards.2   
Strong grew up as the only son in a rigidly religious family in Northampton.  He 
studied law at Harvard in the 1740s.  A disease in his young adulthood affected his 
eyesight.  This is not recorded in other accounts but is in both Bradford and Lodge’s 
biographies.  Lodge attributed this to smallpox.  The number of smallpox outbreaks in 
Massachusetts in the seventeenth and eighteenth make it difficult to pinpoint any specific 
outbreak in which Strong would have lost his eyesight, although blindness was a common 
outcome for those who survived.3   
Before attending Harvard, Strong attended the Dummer Academy then headed by 
Reverend Samuel Moody, a man of high status of his time.  For readers of Strong’s 
nineteenth century biographies, the name Samuel Moody was unmistakable.  For those in 
the present, differentiating among the members of the Moody family can be complicated, 
especially their Samuels, and takes a bit of detective work.  The school continues today 
as the Governor’s Academy to avoid confusing over Dummer’s less flattering 
homophone Dumber.  In Strong’s time the school also provided preparatory education for 
fellow Framer Rufus King and Massachusetts jurist Theophilus Parsons.4 
                                                          
     2 See Jonathan Edwards, A Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work of God in the Conversion of Many 
Hundred Souls in Northampton (Boston: Kneeland T. Green, 1738), 1-102. 
     3 Samuel Bayard Woodward M.D., “The Story of Smallpox in Massachusetts” (address to the 
Massachusetts Medical Society, 1932).  R.D. Semba, “The Ocular Complications of Smallpox and 
Smallpox Immunization,” Archives of Ophthalmology 121, no. 5 (May 2003), 715-9. 
     4 Charles C.P. Moody, Biographical Sketches of the Moody Family (Boston: Samuel G. Drake, 1847): 
118-29. 
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Strong served in municipal and state legislative posts representing Northampton.  
Over the Revolutionary period he served on Massachusetts’ Committee of 
Correspondence and its own state constitutional convention.  He was not part of the 1786 
Annapolis Convention but was chosen, along with Elbridge Gerry, Rufus King, and 
Nathaniel Gorham to represent Massachusetts at the Constitutional Convention in 1788.5 
Francis Dana had also been selected but did not attend.  Dana’s involvement in the 
politics of Strong’s era did not end here, although shortly after he fought for ratification 
at the state level.   
The five delegates appeared on the commission signed by Governor James 
Bowdoin in 1787, although only three were required to represent the state.  Unlike the 
commissions of other states, Massachusetts’ wording left an opening for more drastic 
revisions of the Articles of Confederation. Massachusetts’ commission included the 
phrase “render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the 
preservation of the Union.”  This stands in contrast to neighboring Connecticut who 
wrote “for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation.”  The 
semantics of conventions and commissions will be of greater importance when discussing 
Luther Martin.6 
Strong’s peers held him in some regard as an attorney of a man of sturdy moral 
fiber.  Part of his enduring appeal was that he was not the memorable character of his 
peers.  The traits that would make him a useful figure for Massachusetts Federalists in the 
                                                          
     5 Bradford, Founding Fathers, 11-4. 
     6 Max Farrand ed., The Records of the Federal Convention (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911): 
504-5.  Credentials of Convention members and Commissions from the various states. All Farrand citations 
will refer to this work.  Farrand’s corpus of other amazing works of history are worth perusing but are not 
cited here. Further citations of Farrand will be formatted as Farrand, volume number, page number. 
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early nineteenth century were known in 1787.  He lacked Gorham’s prestige as a 
merchant and as President of the Confederation Congress.  He lacked Gerry’s charisma 
and King’s eloquence.  The growing theme of Strong as a stalwart and reliable figure was 
established in the minds of his convention peers.7     
Two points about the convention are important to consider here.  One point is 
Caleb Strong’s involvement at the convention.  The other is the topic of disunion. These 
are not easily gleaned from the convention records. Given neither to verbosity nor self-
aggrandizement, he spoke infrequently at the convention.  Similarly, dissolution and the 
permanence of the new Union were never consistent ideas at the convention or among the 
Framers in general.  The inconsistency in views, and the vagueness and silence of these 
views, is best attributed to the idea that the two generations of the early republic still 
regarded the new nation as an experiment.  Whether one believed in permanence or not 
was neither a guarantee that it would do so nor a doctrine that it should be so. 
Kenneth Stampp, among others, has documented the views of various Framers 
with regard to the permanence of the new country or the right to withdraw from it.8  It is 
unnecessary to reiterate those accounts and arguments in detail here.  Suffice it to say that 
there was no shortage of Framers on both sides of the argument and, too often, those 
arguments occasionally arose as conviction and, at other times, when they were 
politically expedient polemic.  The constitutionality of disunion is still hotly debated in 
some circles.  The question of whether northern secessionists believed in the 
                                                          
     7 Drawn from the notes of Georgia’s delegate, William Leigh Pierce in Farrand, III, 88. 
     8 Kenneth M. Stampp, “The Concept of a Perpetual Union,” Journal of American History 65 (June 
1978), 5-33.   Stampp drew heavily from Thomas Nagel, One Nation Indivisible: The Union in American 
Thought 1776-1861 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 13-32. 
30 
 
constitutionality of their actions is moot barring detailed analysis of their correspondence.  
The greater point for this essay is that, in the absence of guidance from either the 
Constitution or a preponderance of the Framers, the notion of disunion briefly became a 
constitutional question.  However, the event did not escalate to the point of a 
constitutional crisis, although Caleb Strong, governor of the men, had to answer the 
question to avoid the inevitable liability that would be imputed to all New England 
Federalists if he did not.  This crisis arguably did not resolve until Appomattox although 
the focus here will be from 1803-1815. 
 Caleb Strong came to the convention and stayed, along with Hamilton and 
several others, at the Indian Queen Lodge in Philadelphia.  He participated in the dining 
and discourse at the lodge into the wee hours with the other delegates.  Elbridge Gerry 
had his own private residence not far from the lodge.  Not too many blocks away 
Philadelphia’s own son, Benjamin Franklin, took many of them as guests.9  At the 
convention, Strong put forth few opinions.  He brought from him Massachusetts’ 
willingness to endure annual elections for both the legislature and the executive; an 
opinion shared by few others as strongly except for maybe Connecticut’s Oliver 
Ellsworth.10  
Aside from Pierce’s observations on all of the delegates, Madison’s notes are the 
best source of information on Strong’s limited engagement at the convention.  This could 
have been either his quieter nature or that Madison simply never recorded Strong’s input.  
The convention’s, and the First Congress’s, reliance on Strong in committee belies the 
                                                          
     9 Farrand, III, 58. 
     10 Farrand, I, 360.  Also noted in Bradford, Founding Fathers, 11. 
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notion that he was bereft of opinion.  It may also indicate that he was a neutral arbiter.  
Madison and Strong differed on the matter or proportional and equal representation in the 
legislature.  Strong, perhaps presciently, believed the Union, weak as it was, would 
dissolve over this very matter.  He found the idea of a seven-year term for the executive 
as objectionable as the Electoral College that he believed made an already complex 
government far too complex for its own good.11 Strong seemed convinced, cited in 
multiple accounts, that the convention was nearly going to rupture on the matter of equal 
representation.  He credited his ideological foe and future gubernatorial opponent, 
Elbridge Gerry, for helping to create the final compromise.12 
Strong rose to defend the new document at Massachusetts’ ratification debates.  
Unsurprisingly, he first had to defend the final compromise on biennial elections.  The 
following day he defended the Constitution’s language as precise and explicit.  Whether 
this was sincere or intended as a sales pitch to persuade unwavering Anti-Federalists is 
uncertain.  Ultimately, with the help of elder Anti-Federalists John Hancock and Samuel 
Adams, Massachusetts fell in line and ratified 187 to 168 February 6, 1788.  Ratification 
came with the recommendation for a Bill of Rights.  
Strong’s fears of disunion seemed genuine and perhaps his belief in the goodness 
of compromise to prevent that were well-founded.  He was soon to be part of the new 
country’s formation in the new nation’s first congresses.  Three more states were required 
to establish a new union.  Both Luther Martin’s Maryland and Charles Pinckney’s South 
Carolina were critical although neither ratification vote was particularly close.  The ninth, 
                                                          
     11 Farrand, II, 100.  Also mentioned in Danny Adkinson and Christopher Elliott, “The Electoral College: 
A Misunderstood Institution.” PS: Political Science and Politics 30, no. 1 (March 1997), 77. 
     12 Farrand, III, 261-3. 
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New Hampshire, came within ten votes as did Virginia four days later.  New York 
ratified with a majority of three.  Strong was now to be the most understated and staid 
figure of the zenith of Massachusetts’ power. 
The Congressional Annals offer those in the present an insight into its 
formation.13  The Constitution had laid the groundwork, but the first years of the House 
and Senate were filled with questions of execution and interpretation.  Tristram Dalton 
joined Caleb Strong in the First Congress but was replaced by George Cabot by the 
second.  This was a matter of luck in the First Congress.  The Senate’s biennial rotation 
was chosen by lot in the First Congress.  Strong received the longer term, leaving Dalton 
at the mercy of the Massachusetts’ legislature in the following election, which he lost.   
This was an early peak for Massachusetts’ power.  In the fifteen-year period 
before Jefferson’s election, Caleb Strong took part in Massachusetts’ most powerful 
period.  Bay Staters held the Vice Presidency, and later Presidency, in John Adams.  
Theodore Sedgwick served as Speaker of the House.  To understand what occurs after 
1803, and the emergence of the constitutional crises in which Strong found himself, it is 
necessary to understand the exuberance of Bay State Federalist politics. 
The years 1791 and 1792 helped establish the foundations of the American 
military of the period.  President George Washington wrote frequent messages to the 
Congress on defense matters, which are recorded in the Annals, and the Congress seemed 
more than willing to grant Washington’s wishes.  Washington’s primary military concern 
during this period were the Indians.  The 1791 budget included a military and defense 
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budget as the first session closed.  Resuming business in March, the Senate approved the 
first line of succession in the President’s death or incapacitation in office, the 
appointment of military officers, and the formation of the War Department.  Henry Knox 
had already been serving in that role without official office and sanction for almost three 
years by the time the motion passed the Senate.14   
The military acts that came in 1792 were later identified as the Militia Acts.  
Strong is an intriguing case of a Federalist whose sympathies on military issues aligned 
more with Elbridge Gerry or Luther Martin although, perhaps, for very different reasons.  
There were several key provisions in military lawmaking at this time.  Though Senate 
debate is not well documented, final votes are, including Caleb Strong’s.  He opposed 
employment of Indians in the American military.  Despite his misgivings about the moral 
propriety of offensive warfare, he did support the existence of a military and defense 
infrastructure in the early 1790s.  Strong attempted to create a middle course of a reduced 
force and reduced conscription period for state militias.   
The militia question caused considerable debate during and after the 
Constitutional Convention.  The ability to summon state militias was close enough to a 
standing army to warrant concern among Republicans but it was at least no standing 
army.  Standing armies and navies, and their naval infantry (marine) detachments were an 
anathema to Anti-Federalists, although in 1792 there was no longer a continental navy.15 
The question Strong would face twenty years later would be over whether a state could 
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refuse the call for militia forces; a question even more relevant since Massachusetts had 
the most formidable militia in the country.  The consolation was that militia forces were 
at least comprised of citizens rather than a professional soldiery and officer corps.16   
Strong ultimately voted against the final version of the militia acts that mandated 
nationwide conscription of state militias in national conflicts.  It was as close to a 
standing army Washington could hope to achieve given the varying states of readiness in 
state militias.  Massachusetts’ militia was the best organized and oldest in the new 
republic.  The militia was a Federalist bedrock critical, they believed, to a well-ordered 
society.  Rigid rank structures also helped reinforce the ideal stratification Federalists 
valued. The New England militia’s reputation had been well-earned during the 
Revolutionary War.  Strong and others’ reluctance might have been ideological, but there 
was a general distrust of placing such an estimable organization under federal control, 
especially after 1803.17 
Strong sought retirement after his term in the Senate but became the Governor of 
Massachusetts, and her militia, four years after the conclusion of his Senate term.  The 
political factionalism so apparent in the final ratification twelve years earlier had grown 
increasingly toxic although not necessarily corrupt, especially compared to neighboring 
New Jersey whose politics in the preceding decade were far from the republican ideals 
espoused at the convention.  Throughout the Revolutionary years, politicians from 
northern Essex County had thrown a wrench in state politics, and later in the Federalist 
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Party.  Charles Raymond Brown attributes the moniker “Essex Junto” to John Hancock. 
The Junto formed an anti-Adams coalition in the Federalist Party and exerted enough 
influence to be known to politicians outside of Massachusetts.18   
Whether these regional politicians were as organized as Hancock and others 
would later contest has occasionally been a point of scholarly contention.  One point that 
unified the disparate members of the supposed Junto was their opposition to John Adams.  
The more vocal members of Essex could barely hide their contempt.19  However, the 
main feature of the Junto for this investigation were their failed efforts at fomenting 
secession from the new republic.  Brown places Strong in the Junto although he gets the 
details of Strong’s birthplace and association with northern Massachusetts entirely 
incorrect.20 
An example of sparring between Essex and Adams Federalists occurred during 
Adams’ own administration during this height of Federalist power.  The latter half of 
Adams’ administration had been blessed with Federalist majorities in both houses of 
Congress.  These majorities permitted easy passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts which 
seemed to its critics to illegalize dissent.  This began the destruction of the Federalist 
stronghold in politics, a zenith it would never regain at a national level.  James Madison 
and Thomas Jefferson anonymously authored the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and 
held to the interposition doctrine even if Jefferson wanted to take more radical steps 
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toward a doctrine of nullification.21  The Essex Junto suddenly had the upper hand and 
endorsed Aaron Burr for the presidency in 1800 against the rising Jefferson.  Alexander 
Hamilton, a useful ally to the Junto, broke from their ranks to thwart the equally 
distasteful election of Burr.  The Democratic Republicans prevailed and, on the thirty-
sixth ballot in the House of Representatives, Jefferson became the third president.22 
Meanwhile in Massachusetts, Strong’s re-election as governor was met with 
general approval.  His inaugural address was spent expositing the highest ideals of 
Northern Federalism – a mixture of public religiosity and paternalism.  He praised the 
Massachusetts militia and lent his quiet approval to the Alien and Sedition Acts.  Strong’s 
speaking was frequently given to allusion rather than directness.23  It was also an 
unavoidable act of public mourning to eulogize the late George Washington.  No one, 
including Pickering, could avoid Washington’s cult of celebrity in public mourning or 
even private correspondence.   
Jefferson was preoccupied with France’s acquisition of most of the new continent 
from Spain.  The geopolitical concerns, for Jefferson, outweighed the constitutional 
necessities of treaty-making and, in 1803, he secured the purchase of over 800,000 square 
miles of North American territory in the Louisiana Purchase.  Federalist outrage swelled 
over the constitutionality of the purchase although, lingering the background, was a much 
larger issue of congressional apportionment.  The Federalists knew in the state of politics 
in 1803-4 that allowing slavery in the new territory would bolster southern power and 
                                                          
     21 Adrienne Koch and Harry Ammon, “The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in 
Jefferson’s and Madison’s Defense of Civil Liberties,” William and Mary Quarterly 5 (April 1948), 145-
176. 
     22 Brown, “Essex Junto,” 25-30. 
     23 Caleb Strong, National Intelligencer and Washington Advertiser, November 24, 1800.  
37 
 
representation through the three-fifths compromise.  These fears would prove overblown 
in the short term although they would be realized fifteen years later during the Missouri 
crisis. 
What ensued was more the folly of a handful of Essex-aligned Federalists than a 
mass movement.  The drive for northern secession was the brainchild of Federalist radical 
Timothy Pickering.  Strong’s place in this narrative is problematic.  Even though he 
would presumably have been a governor within this new proposed nation, there is little 
indication that anything that occurred in 1803-4 reached his attention although for Aaron 
Burr it became a national scandal. Pickering’s plan was grandiose for its time: secure 
Federalist majorities in New England states, orchestrate Aaron Burr’s election as 
governor of New York, then secede.24 
Before dismissing Pickering’s fragile concept of union as impracticable, it is 
important to note that Pickering was not alone in his conception of the new country as an 
experiment in 1803. Even among Framers states’ rights thought held some primacy.  
Madison and Jefferson first articulated this in their anonymous Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions.  As Kevin Gannon has noted, threats of disunion from northerners were also 
frequent.  Around the same time Henry Cabot Lodge wrote his biography of Caleb Strong 
he also wrote of his great-grandfather George Cabot and accurately stated that "the hard, 
matter-of-fact way, in which men seventy-five years ago argued about the advantages and 
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disadvantages of a dissolution of the Union, was as natural and proper as it is for us to 
consider that question no longer an open one.”25 
Timothy Pickering takes the spotlight in 1803 while Strong recedes into the 
background.  Pickering and Samuel Adams were not sent to the Convention.  John 
Adams was in London at the time.  Massachusetts had, likely for the better of the 
Convention, sent its least doctrinaire figures as delegates, Strong among them.  It is 
unnecessary to recapitulate the diplomatic melee in 1798 between France, then governed 
by the hawkish Directory government, and the United States.  What is important to note 
is that the events drove Pickering, then Secretary of State in the Adams administration, 
into a state of near-paranoia that led to his dismissal from his cabinet post.  Pickering and 
Adams had also been at odds over the expansion of the military.  The military grew, re-
establishing the Navy and Marine Corps, and adding the progenitor of the Public Health 
Service.  Pickering favored an even larger force, especially an Army, to counteract what 
he perceived to be the growing threat of French and Spanish involvement on the 
continent.26   
Elbridge Gerry led the diplomatic negotiations with the French.27  Pickering 
hoped for Gerry’s failure and a full-scale war.  However, in a period of otherwise strong 
party unity among Federalists, Pickering was unable to maintain party discipline or a 
sense of compromise.  Pickering led a small cabal of radical Federalists at the Coyle 
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Boarding House in Washington D.C. which catered primarily to Federalists.  In this 
impenetrable bubble, Pickering pushed his plan for secession.28 
Hamilton, who was killed by the secessionists’ hopeful President, Aaron Burr, 
was aware of the plan as was Rufus King.  Neither provided their assent to the idea of 
secession.  No leading Federalist did so.  As stated, it seems unlikely Strong was aware of 
the goings-on at Coyle that year.  It was clear by his January 1805 address to the 
Massachusetts legislature, however, that he was finally informed of what happened.  It 
was one of Strong’s longest addresses although, typical of his rhetoric, he avoids 
discussing the issue directly preferring a warning against factions in the presence of 
enemies.  Typical of a Founder, he invoked ancient governments and their collapse.  The 
House’s response lacked Strong’s compunctions and addressed the secessionists directly. 
29  
Pickering was spared enough humiliation to serve as both a Senator and member 
of the House for Massachusetts until the disastrous fallout of the Hartford Convention 
which forced his retirement from public service completely.  He died in 1829.  Strong 
and Pickering would spar more directly in 1814 over Massachusetts’ involvement in the 
War of 1812. 
Strong had two periods of retirement from public life.  His Senate term ended in 
1796 and former Speaker of the House Theodore Sedgwick took his seat for the next 
term.  Fellow Framer Jonathan Dayton from New Jersey took the Speakership.  Strong 
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disappears largely from public view until his gubernatorial election in 1800.  Following 
the hotly contested election in 1807, he bowed out of public view yet again.  His tenure 
was remarkably stable.  The party majorities in the Massachusetts legislature would 
become more fluid. 
Strong ran against Elbridge Gerry in 1812.  Gerry’s tenure in office was amiable 
enough with Federalist majorities, but when the pendulum swung in favor of Republicans 
once again, Gerry abandoned any pretense of bipartisanship.  Gerry made waves with his 
re-districting plan to sustain permanent Republican majorities: the eponymous 
gerrymandering. Embroiled in scandal, the Federalists brought Strong out of retirement 
once again.  The nation had gone to war against Great Britain and Strong was now a 
wartime governor in a conflict that could very well bring the frontline to his own shores 
and would. Pickering’s own vision was reified except the enemy was not France.  Gerry 
died two years later while serving as James Madison’s Vice-President.30 
The thought of a wartime governor carries little weight in the present day that has 
been absent coordinated attacks on the mainland from enemy nations.  The demarcation 
between state militias and regular forces gave governors great responsibility in the event 
of a mainland invasion on their soil.  It is no coincidence that Strong spent many of his 
annual addresses in his first seven year stretch as governor to discuss militia readiness. 
 Of equal importance in the militia was the question of leadership and the 
summoning of forces.  It was a foregone conclusion that in most circumstances that a son 
of the state would command its militia rather than a federal outsider.  The significance 
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afforded to the militia’s place in a well-ordered society has been discussed.  In one sense 
these two implicit rules are related, the gravity and importance of the militia to a society 
was tied to the best members of that society commanding it.31 
 That is not to say, however, that offensive warfare was an acceptable role for the 
militia.  Many New England clergy had Federalist leanings.  Piety and politics were 
intertwined when it came to the matter of war.  Offensive war was a divine punishment 
and a call for reconciliation and penance. Some ministers added qualifiers that a war 
could be necessary and just as long as it was defensive in nature.  Others struck a more 
pacifistic tone.  It is important to give public religion in New England its weight in 
shaping political opinion in the early nineteenth century.  There was immense 
disapproval of the War of 1812; the congressional vote itself one of the closest votes on a 
declaration of war or authorization of force until 1991.32 
 Understanding Hartford requires starting in the present and working backward 
before dealing with the events of 1814 by themselves.  Hartford is traditionally 
understood as a secessionist movement and it bore that stigma even its own time.  The 
opponents of the convention and Essex Federalists (i.e. the Adamses) created this 
persistent fiction. There was no shortage of radical opinions in scattered editorials during 
the lead up to Hartford, but the Convention itself had nothing to do with secession or 
even nullification. Part of the problem for Hartford’s legacy also lay with the timing.  The 
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surge of patriotism following the Battle of New Orleans, and the ascendance of Andrew 
Jackson, made any movement like Hartford, especially with rumors of secession, all the 
more suspicious.33 
 Pickering’s ill-fated secession attempt probably had much to do with this taint and 
Pickering was no less doctrinaire in 1814.  Writing to Strong that same year, Pickering 
excoriated the war and his closing comments and claimed that the Republicans had 
brought the country to the “brink of ruin.”  His language was strong but careful not to 
make any recommendations.  Strong’s reply was amiable but ignored Pickering’s 
criticisms of the opposite party.34  Pickering’s exchanges with Gouverneur Morris made 
his last comments to Strong look moderated in comparison.  For Strong and Morris, the 
current situation amounted to a tyranny that had to be stopped.35  This is not to say that 
some radicals were not calling for secession before Hartford.  However, nothing was  
achieved.36 
 Luckily, considering the damage impressions alone caused the Hartford cause, 
moderate voices prevailed during the convention itself.  It was not the only convention of 
the period, though it was the largest.  It was also not without precedent.  Far from a 
secession or nullification call, Hartford fit squarely in the controversial, yet incredibly 
vague, realm of interposition just like the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions sixteen 
years before.  The two parties’ reversal of roles in sixteen years was glaringly apparent. 
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 Fourteen years after the Convention, the surviving Federalists and John Quincy 
Adams began a series of tense exchanges about the legacy of the Massachusetts 
Federalist Party.  Adams accused the Federalists of having an eye to the dissolution not 
only during Pickering’s attempt in 1803-4 but during the bitter intervening period during 
Jefferson’s embargo.  Adams spared no words or feelings in haranguing Harrison Gray 
Otis, John Lowell, Henry Cabot, and other leaders.  Adams published these charges as a 
sitting President in 1828.  The retorts continued through the remainder of the decade with 
no resolution.   
 At its core, the Hartford Convention was an interposition to address issues that 
had arisen during the preceding two years during the War of 1812.  Theodore Dwight’s 
lengthy history of the convention, written in 1833, began the history much earlier.  Two 
thirds of the three hundred page history are devoted to events occurring before the War of 
1812.  The Dwight family had long been a Federalist fixture of both Northampton and 
Hartford.  However, in all histories, the events of 1813 and 1814 leading up to Hartford 
were simple.37 In 1813, to offset the movement of troops to the Canadian frontier to fight 
the British offensively, James Madison called on the militias to fill the defensive gaps in 
their respective states.38 
 Strong was part of a triad of governors including Roger Griswold of Connecticut 
and William Jones of Rhode Island who took a suspicious view of this request in 1813.  
Strong, with the assent of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, refused to comply.  
Griswold and Jones also refused with each having the support of his state legislature.  
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This was hardly surprising. Militiamen from Pennsylvania and neighboring states had 
been conscripted in the Canadian campaign and were not defending their states.  Strong 
and his peers in New England did not believe the Canadian operation was a just part of 
the war.  There was also, at least in 1813, no imminent threat of invasion that would 
demand state militia involvement.39 
 The religious opposition to the war has been noted earlier, but there were also 
practical concerns apart from divine punishment for the Madison presidency.  
Summoning the militia would disrupt an already volatile economy by taking away 
producers and farmers away from their trades.  Overall, the readiness and capability of 
the New England militias were still enviable.  The regular Army, and the Navy, were 
operationally ineffective although tactically fierce.  Naturally, this dovetailed into another 
reason for opposing the war: the nation was simply unprepared for it.40 Opposition or not, 
Federalists were still Federalists.  Calamity and factionalism were very un-Federalist 
tendencies. Strong and other Federalist leaders urged calm despite the more strident 
opinions in papers and from the tempestuous Pickering.  A New Jersey convention also 
called for using legal means to resist.41 Paying one’s taxes was fine; enlisting was another 
matter.   
However, in 1814, invasion was no longer mere threat. The British began 
invasions and bombardments of the New England coast.  Left largely undefended by the 
regular forces and navy, New England was on the hook not only for its own defense but 
for paying its monetary costs as well.  Sympathies for New England after its refusal to 
                                                          
     39 Hickey, Genesis of the Hartford Convention, 589-91. 
     40 Cress, “Cool and Serious Reflection,” 125-32. 
     41 Cress, “Cool and Serious Reflection,” 136-8. 
45 
 
send troops was mixed.  On the one hand the Canadian invasion cost the mainland its 
regular army for defense.  However, New England still paid its taxes to the war and was 
now left in a poor defensive posture.  The federal and constitutional boundaries between 
state militias and the regular military and problems with defense were the impetuses for 
the Hartford Convention despite whatever other radical elements had in mind.42 
The Massachusetts legislature provided the convention delegates with its 
commission.  The states were to assume their own defense and to be taxed appropriately.  
The original commission called for amending the United States Constitution to this 
effect.  Remove the three-fifths clause, require a congressional supermajority for war 
declarations, and enforce a one-term limit for each President with the proviso that 
succeeding presidents must be from a different state than his predecessor.  The language 
was transparently political.  This was a maneuver to strip power away from Virginia and 
other southern states.  Strong was not a sitting delegate although he provided his assent 
by opening its deliberations with prayer.43 Nathan Dane, an elder Essex statesman and 
member of the Junto, chaired the more important committees which finalized the dicta of 
the Convention.  Dane served as a voice of moderation as well.44 
                                                          
     42 James M. Banner, To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in 
Massachusetts, 1789-1815 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980). 
     43 Letters from Christopher Gore to Caleb Strong would indicate that Strong was ignorant of the daily 
proceedings of the convention. Strong was probably not taking totally a hands-off approach but probably 
had some faith in Nathan Dane while keeping tabs via Gore.  See Adams, Documents Relating to New 
England Federalism, 422-3.  Gore, like the convention’s chairman, George Cabot, had their own 
misgivings with the Republicans during the Embargo Acts of 1807 during Strong’s temporary retirement. 
Gore’s influence in Massachusetts politics during Strong’s second retirement is far greater than can 
recounted here. 
     44 Dane is a regrettably forgotten figure as well.  It was his resolution in the Confederation Congress to 
have the Philadelphia convention in 1787.  A digestible biographical sketch is available.  See Dean W. 
Eastman, “Nathan Dane” in The Yale Biographical Dictionary of American Law, ed. Roger K. Newman 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 147-8.  Dane and Strong had concurrent legal and political 
careers in Massachusetts.  Despite Dane’s proposal in 1787, he wrote Caleb Strong October 10, 1787 with 
his reservations. See The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, ed. John P. 
46 
 
On the war front, Strong’s militia left Maine in a precarious position in 1814.  The 
year prior, the refusal to fund federal military operations left the regular army’s frontier 
campaigns, largely in Maine’s territory, without needful assistance against the British.  
Maine, already long politically distant from the rest of Strong’s Federalist Massachusetts, 
used the Federalists’ wartime politicking for a call to independent statehood.  The debacle 
of Maine’s statehood will be covered in another chapter.  Strong’s influence over events 
at Hartford helped to maintain a more moderated position away from the likes of 
Pickering and Josiah Quincy, but the cost of his interposition was the disaffection of 
Maine and the waning of Federalist power.45 
Unfortunately for the Hartford delegates, Andrew Jackson’s victory in New 
Orleans changed the negotiations at Ghent.  Three delegates were en route to Washington 
when the Treaty of Ghent was signed.  Their hope to embarrass the Republican 
administration instead brought heaps of scorn on them.  One very irreverent cartoon 
featured the three delegates sailing in a chamber pot christened “The Hartford.”  The ship 
had sprung a leak and was doomed to sink presumably from the delegates’ own 
excrement.  The speech balloons were drawn with swirling words seeming to imply the 
men were talking in circles or that their words sprung from the feculent odor.46  Despite 
the published exchanges between John Quincy Adams and the surviving Federalists, the 
Federalist period was over.  1824 would usher in an entirely new party system entirely 
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bereft of the Federalist Party.  It is likely that Theodore Dwight’s massive history of 
Hartford was a response to this criticism and defense of the Federalist Party.47 
Caleb Strong died in 1819, three years after leaving office.  His final speech 
before his ultimate retirement was conciliatory despite everything that had occurred.  He 
did not live to see the finality of the Maine separation or its difficult context during the 
Missouri crisis.  His successor, John Brooks, was one of the last Federalists elected.  
Strong’s consistency on the indissolubility of the union kept Massachusetts politics and 
the Hartford Convention free of the radicalism that had long infected Pickering, Quincy, 
and other men.  However, Strong’s refusal to contribute the state militia was more 
problematic.  Not initially predisposed to turning against the federal government, 
Strong’s position put the state in a precarious financial position and left his frontier 
unprotected from the British.  The lawfulness, or constitutionality, of his position was 
likely solid although it was folly to assume that New England would remain free from 
invasion for long.  The decisions were grounded in his moderation and convictions but 
were mistakes borne of political, rather than defensive, calculation.  Unfortunately, 
Strong and others had little narrative control over Hartford leaving its supporters publicly 
clamoring over the convention’s legacy a generation later.  Strong had navigated two 
constitutional crises: federal control of the militia and the right of secession though later 
histories, including much of the later calumny about Hartford, made little mention of him 
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despite his presence.  Though far from being background noise, Strong was a stabilizing 
presence in a party tearing itself apart. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
CHARLES PINCKNEY, SLAVERY, APPORTIONMENT, AND TERRITORIES 
 
 
This chapter will focus on Charles Pinckney and the Missouri Compromise.  At 
the end of his political career, Pinckney lent his authority as a Framer to the debate over 
Missouri’s application for statehood.  He drew on longstanding questions of 
constitutional interpretation on various clauses and sections: Congress’ authority to 
regulate slavery in territories, the historical basis of the three-fifths compromise, and the 
meaning of the migration and importation clause. 
Charles Pinckney was born into one of South Carolina’s most prominent political 
and agricultural families.  His cousin, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, was also a delegate 
to the Constitutional Convention and his brother, Thomas Pinckney, was an early 
governor of South Carolina following the Revolutionary War.  Pinckney was also tied to 
other prominent South Carolina families – Rutledges, Laurenses, and Ramsays – through 
marriage.  His later break with the Federalists was also a break with a longstanding 
family lineage of Federalists.1 The Pinckneys had endured South Carolina’s unforgiving 
summer weather, and its tendency toward tropical disease, and remained long enough to 
                                                          
     1 Marty D. Matthews, Forgotten Founder: The Life and Times of Charles Pinckney (Charleston: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2004): 1-24.  This is the only recent and scholarly biography of Charles 
Pinckney to date. 
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be part of its growth and vitality that made it so important in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.   
Charles Pinckney was not the youngest delegate at the Convention; that title went 
to Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey.  He had still not reached his thirties when he was 
chosen to go to Philadelphia with four other South Carolina delegates in 1787.  
Pinckney’s fearlessness and vanity placed him at the forefront of numerous debates at the 
convention over suffrage, state sovereignty, and the powers of the executive branch.  
Despite his later leanings toward greater states’ rights, Pinckney was not an initial 
champion of Anti-Federalist ideas.  The one issue, perhaps the biggest issue, which led 
him toward states’ rights was the issue of slavery.2 
Pinckney naturally brought with him a desire to protect southern interests.  His 
position on critical constitutional issues indicated a belief that even an energetic federal 
government it should never intervene on the slavery issue.  He once endorsed a 
congressional veto of state laws, legislative election of the executive, and a shared fear of 
too much democracy with other Federalists.  The legislature would be best suited to know 
what type of executive would best carry out its laws.  He shared with North Carolina’s 
Hugh Williamson a proportional representation scheme, perhaps believing that 
apportionment including its slaves would give South Carolina parity with larger states.3   
There have been a few debates over the years about the extent of Pinckney’s 
contribution to the final draft of the Constitution.  As noted in the introduction, textual 
                                                          
     2 Indexed entries on slavery in Farrand are too numerous to recount here.  Bradford, Founding Fathers, 
201-4.  James Madison also penned a defense of the three-fifths compromise in The Federalist 54. 
     3 Ralph Ketcham, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates (New York: 
Signet, 1986), 100. 
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evidence supports the notion that Pinckney might have authored entire drafts of the 
Constitution.  Madison’s notes are silent about the draft.  Pinckney’s youth and bravado 
might not have endeared him to some of the convention members, but his vigorous 
support of the Constitution probably helped push South Carolina toward ratification. 
Pinckney would likely have enjoyed the plaudits that would have been afforded 
the primary author of the Constitution.  Framers and Founders were typically held in high 
regard.  In the thirty-three years that separated the convention and the debates over 
Missouri’s statehood, the Marshall Court had inherited the duty of Constitutional 
interpretation including its power of judicial review.  This did not endear Marshall, or the 
Constitution, to South Carolina.  Pinckney’s 1820 exegesis of the Constitution did not 
offer any clues to the extent of his authorship.  His peer, John Rutledge, had chaired the 
committee that produced the original draft.4   However, Pinckney avoided the question of 
authorship, if he ever was an author of much of the document, but became its southern 
expositor in the Sixteenth Congress.  While much of Pinckney’s analysis was accurate, it 
was an analysis suited to the political climate of 1820s South Carolina and indeed to any 
politician or political faction interested in keeping Congress away from the question of 
slavery in Missouri. 
Thirty-two years earlier, at the South Carolina ratification convention in May 
1788, Pinckney had also made opening remarks.  Pinckney began what may likely be the 
germinal qualities of an American exceptionalism – America had inspired other European 
revolutions.  He spoke of a mutual interdependence among all classes, of planters, 
                                                          
     4 Charles C. Nott, The Mystery of the Pinckney Draught (New York: The Century Company, 1908): 3-
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manufacturers, and merchants.  Pinckney had an extensive knowledge of state 
governments and of the differences politically, and in public manners, of men across the 
new nation.  Pinckney concluded with a call for unity and harmony.  Though neglected 
and buried in state level archives, the speech is a powerful piece of rhetoric.5  Pinckney’s 
speech is thick with irony as his biographer Marty Matthew notes.  Pinckney excoriated 
European governments, the peerage, aristocracy, religious persecution, and laws of 
primogeniture. His rhetoric is incredibly democratic and egalitarian even as he held a 
suspicion of democracy and jealously guarded suffrage for only the elite.  Pinckney’s 
conception of American life and commerce was one of interdependence between classes 
of wealth and classes of occupation. 
Pinckney made a sweeping history of the colonies and concluded with a brief pro-
and-con of various forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy, republics, and mixed 
systems.  The discussion of these forms of government and of foreign governments has 
some degree of exaggeration but it still shows incredible knowledge that, outside of Hugh 
Williamson, is not often accorded to southern Framers outside of Virginia.  Pinckney 
closed his speech floridly tethering the United States to the future of all mankind.  He 
referred to the men of the North as brethren and called for national unity, which naturally 
entailed ratification of the new constitution.6   
South Carolina’s own sectional splits were apparent in the two major votes of the 
ratification process: the vote for convention and the final vote on ratification.  With only 
                                                          
     5 Debates which Arose in the House of Representatives of South Carolina, on the Constitution of the 
United States, by a Convention of Delegates Assembled at Philadelphia together with such notices of the 
Convention as Could be Procured (Charleston: A.E. Miller, 1831) 1-56. 
     6 Debates which Arose in the House of Representatives of South Carolina, 74-9. 
53 
 
a handful of exceptions in Prince Frederick and St. Bartholomew parishes, opposition to 
both votes was firmly entrenched in the Piedmont and Upcountry toward the 
Appalachians.  Pinckney and the colonial Tidewater prevailed despite a geographic and 
spatial (but not representational) majority throughout the remainder of the state. 
The elder Pinckney was sixty-three when elected to the House of Representatives 
in 1818.  Pinckney, like Rufus King in the Senate, was the lone surviving Framer in the 
House.  Pinckney was aware of this status although, for much of the lengthy debates over 
Missouri statehood, Pinckney remained silent on the floor allowing Henry Clay and John 
Taylor to dominate much of the discussion that had, by February 1820, lasted for nearly 
two years.7  The debate sporadically arose among other key issues of the day, namely 
Revolutionary War pensions that neatly mark the generational leap from 1787 to 1820.8   
Debate on Missouri arose but was quickly swept aside.  Both Rawlins Lowndes of 
South Carolina and Missouri’s at-large delate in the House, John Scott, pushed for 
action.9  A debate that seems petty to contemporary ears ensued about the history of the 
admission of states.  Clay recoiled at connecting Maine and Missouri statehood questions 
because of his own state, Kentucky’s, own early statehood mini-crisis with Vermont, a 
non-slave state, from 1791-2.  Other representatives chimed in mentioning Alabama’s 
admission the year before. What of the many stipulations placed on Louisiana’s 
admission?  Clay’s attempt to couple Missouri and Maine, and his memory of Vermont 
and Kentucky, was called out as an instance of hypocrisy.  Opponents asked Clay if it 
was wrong to do it in 1791 why is it right to do so now?  Clay, usually an aggressive 
                                                          
     7 Annals of Congress, 16th Congress, 1st sess., 1820. 
     8 Pinckney was unusually silent on this issue as well. 
     9 Annals of Congress, 16th Congress, 1st sess., 1820. 
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presence in the House, backed down.  Connecticut’s Samuel Foot, no small figure in the 
Missouri crisis, intervened at this juncture to focus on Maine’s representation in the 
House as it separated from Massachusetts – an important issue in its own right.10 
Congress reconvened after a very brief recess in January 1820.  New York’s 
William Storrs attempted to resume the Missouri debate, although his attempt would, too, 
be ill-fated.  Storrs attempted to attach his name to an early compromise very similar to 
the eventual Missouri Compromise the following year: slavery would be banned north of 
a certain latitude and fugitive slaves could be reclaimed.  Here Storrs began an interesting 
conversation on the Constitution: despite the migration or importation clause in the 
Constitution, Congress still had broad power to regulate slavery via the commerce clause.   
This prefaces Pinckney’s February 1820 speech before the House.  Even 
considering Pinckney’s convention speeches, and his speeches during South Carolina’s 
ratification of the Constitution, his speech on the Missouri crisis is his legacy speech.  
Aware of his place as the House’s sole Framer, he arose and spoke. Pinckney’s speech 
was more than a routine floor speech.  This perhaps owes to age as well as his own 
eloquence, which had been on display for decades, and his interest in securing a legacy.  
This was Pinckney’s exegesis of the Constitution and of American history to that point.  
He derided the confederated government as a “miserable, feeble mockery of government” 
and spoke to its near dissolution by 1785 as several states to pay into its treasury. 
Pinckney began not with an opinion but a discussion of his silence on the matter.  
Surviving Founders, usually Madison and Jefferson, could be notoriously reluctant to 
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speak on early republic politics.11  Nine months following the speech, Jefferson wrote 
approvingly to Pinckney and excoriated northern banking interests.  Jefferson’s health 
was on the decline and he had not seen Pinckney in almost two decades at the time.  
Jefferson wrote to Albert Gallatin in December 1820 with a slightly more pessimistic 
tone linking the sectional misfortunes in the United States to the turmoil in Germany and 
England.12 
Pinckney’s silence in the House on the matter up until this point might have been 
a tactical matter.  When he did speak it would carry the weight of a Framer who wanted 
to allow the newer generation to manage its own affairs as his retired contemporaries had.  
This assumption seems bolstered by Pinckney’s insistence as a moderate voice with the 
authority as the sole Framer in the House.  His primary concern was of the issue of 
slavery in Missouri although he could not broach that topic without first making his way 
through others.  Thought it is not explicit in the speech, another generational break 
between the Framers and Early Republic Congressmen is evident here.  Pinckney saw 
slavery as quite necessary, but far from an evil. 
Thirty-three years earlier at the convention, Pinckney had rejected any hope of 
South Carolina’s ratification without protection of slavery although he implied to his 
fellow Framers that South Carolina could eventually retire slave importation just as 
Virginia and Maryland had.13  Jefferson’s letter spoke to Pinckney as someone who 
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     12 Thomas Jefferson, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Pinckney (September 20, 1820), Founders 
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equally detested the “peculiar institution” but acknowledged its present necessity 
economically.14   
  Rhetoric on this topic had changed dramatically since the Framers were in their 
prime.  Representatives like William Smith and William Barnwell Rhett had moved the 
dialogue to conclude that slavery was a positive good for society rather than a necessary 
evil.15  In the numerous early debates over the Tallmadge Amendment and the Missouri 
Compromise, anti-slavery forces reached beyond the Constitution’s language and 
appealed to the Declaration of Independence’s language of equality.  The often legalistic 
arguments of southern representatives did not leave much conciliatory room for the 
emotional appeals to the Declaration of Independence.  Nathaniel Macon rejected any 
legal interpretation of the Declaration of Independence outright. 
Pinckney continued his speech but lapsed from moderate language into a screed 
on the three-fifths compromise laden with sarcasm.  Had northern states in 1787 accepted 
the three-fifths compromise on the notion that it would likely be of little consequence 
later on?  Had the compromise been wrung from northern men to create a new Union?  
Pinckney saw these assertions as deliberate errors.  It is unclear whether Pinckney was 
stating that the compromise was uncontroversial in its own time.  That assertion would 
have been as deliberate an error as any.  Pinckney abandoned the question if this was the 
case. 
                                                          
     14 See also Notes on Virginia. This simplifies and glosses over a contentious historiographical debate 
involving antebellum thought and its usual divisions into pre-post Jeffersonian periods.  Despite Jefferson’s 
claims to the contrary, slavery interests flourished under his leadership and that of his intellectual heirs.  
Some historians have discarded the pre/post periodization entirely while others defend it or at least are not 
willing to discard it entirely. 
     15 Philip F. Detweiler, “Congressional Debate on Slavery and the Declaration of Independence, 1819-
1821,” American Historical Review 63, no. 3 (April 1958), 605. 
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Indeed, the three-fifths representation rule had grown into a rhetorical tool among 
antislavery forces although 1819-20 were not the first years that complaints about the 
representation had occurred.  Hugh Williamson, who had only recently died in 1819, 
proposed the idea first although it was rejected until made again by his North Carolina 
peer, William Davie.  As seen in the previous chapter, Davie had been equally engaged 
with the politics of the early republic although it is difficult to discern from his few 
surviving letters what he thought in the waning months of his life in 1820 about 
Missouri.16  Disdain for the three-fifths rule had arisen several times since the early 
nineteenth century, particularly during the Louisiana Purchase as several politicians, 
presciently it turned out, wondered about the future of politics and slavery in new 
territories.17 
Pinckney left this as the final mention of the three-fifths rule in his speech.  This 
might also have been a tactical move as many of the rule’s critics were accurate in their 
discussion of how it bolstered southern influence in government, particularly that of 
slaveholders.  Indeed, by 1860, although the overall slaveholding population of the 
United States had dwindled to barely four percent, slaveholders maintained power far 
beyond their numbers in matters like the Missouri crisis.18  Pinckney instead focused on 
the economic vitality of South Carolina where he was on much firmer ground. 
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For Pinckney in 1820, the issue was not northern and antislavery complaints per 
se, but their very right to make such complaints.  The attacks on slave representation and 
the right to slavery in southern and western states were to the point that fostered intra-
national enmity.  He referenced Britain’s attacks on the colonial economy and, perhaps 
hyperbolically, decried the attempts at controlling slavery in Missouri as worse than that 
offense.  At one point, Pinckney refers to slaves as property, a point that in his prime at 
the convention would have stirred northern opposition to the three-fifths rule as asinine 
since no other property in the Union would have been factored into apportionment.  
Pinckney spoke approvingly of southern blacks, their service in the past wars, and the 
common blood shed between white and black men alike.   
Pinckney compared the exports of the Northeast, including Maine, and those of 
the slaveholding states.  He cited a document from the treasury, although it is unclear 
which one it was, only that it had been released “a few weeks ago.”  The Annual Report 
of the Finances does not divide imports and exports along sectional lines the way that 
Pinckney described them.19  Pinckney spoke of the national financial troubles that had 
arisen in the wake of the Panic of 1819.  He largely glossed over much of the detail 
necessary to understand the issues at hand.  In the aftermath of the War of 1812, as 
peacetime markets readjusted in Europe, the United States was flooded with cheaper 
European goods that adversely affected the northern manufacturing sector while southern 
agricultural exports were on the rise.  Import duties on the whole had been on the decline 
after the War of 1812.  Whether Pinckney’s omission was deliberate or borne of 
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ignorance is uncertain.  The rhetorical goal was to defend southern slavery and, 
consequently, to attack northern complaints about the three-fifths representation.  
Although by 1820 exports were on the decline as Europe recovered, agricultural interests 
in the South weathered the panic better than others.  Also of note: the final debt of the 
Louisiana Purchase was due, in specie, by 1819. 
It is difficult in the present to understand the apparent hypocrisy of Pinckney’s 
clamor for treatment of slaves as members of the population.  The arguments for this had 
begun at the convention mostly along, though not entirely along, sectional lines.  There 
was little impetus from northern Framers to offer equal representation to slaves because it 
would assume equality among white citizens and black slaves.20  Indeed, it is difficult to 
accept that southern politicians would call for equality in representation for men and 
women denied any stake in the destiny and day-to-day decision-making in the southern 
states.  Could this have been a common problem among black and white in South 
Carolina in 1820?  South Carolina residents were “represented” but were denied suffrage 
and many of the privileges of the planter class.  White men in possession of fifty acres for 
a minimum of six months or taxpayers of three shillings sterling who had lived in their 
district for six months could vote.21 This is unlikely. The previous requirements for 
suffrage in South Carolina required a greater freehold of land, but this was fairly easy to 
obtain: over eighty percent of adult white males in South Carolina owned sufficient land 
for suffrage as early as the 1780s.22  In fact, South Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia were 
the only three of the original thirteen states that continued to ban black voters in the 
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1780s.  Pinckney seemed satisfied that nearly forty years after the Revolution, it was 
wholly unjust to not count men and women entirely bereft of rights of suffrage (among 
others) as citizens because of their contributions to the economy for which they 
benefitted little.23 
Pinckney’s constitutional exegesis in his speech on the House floor continued.  
Here he commented on the migration or importation clause. He derided his colleagues for 
what he considered a deliberate misrepresentation of its intent.  The argument might have 
been moot considering the nebulous clause could have easily been superseded by the 
broad latitude of the commerce clause.  Pinckney acceded to the notion that had it not 
been for the 1808 clause that the commerce clause could have granted Congress the 
power to restrict slavery much sooner. However, the South’s agreement to stop 
importation was “a solemnly understood compact, that, on the southern states consenting 
to shut their ports against the importation of Africans, no power was to be delegated to 
Congress, nor were they every authorized to touch the question of slavery. . .”  While this 
statement was contentious enough, Pinckney’s explanation of migration was of far 
greater interest.  Importation referred to African slaves; migration to free whites.24   
On the surface, Pinckney’s claim seemed like an obfuscation, but it had merit.  
Luther Martin and other Northerners were willing to trade liberality on the issue of 
slavery for liberality on navigation and trade.25  Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles 
Pinckney’s cousin and fellow delegate to the convention (and also alive into the 1820s 
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like his cousin) approved of such a deal.26 If migration also applied to slaves it would 
imply that Congress had power to regulate both foreign and interstate slave trafficking 
after 1808.   
Pinckney closed his speech with two points.  The first lauded southern slavery as 
not only the positive force for the American economy but also the best for the slaves 
themselves.  He began much of the early lauding of southern slavery’s paternalistic 
qualities; confusing, as many in the present, paternalism for altruism.  Pinckney’s 
assessment of free blacks, as well as Louisiana’s slaves, were grounded in caricatures that 
would take hold for nearly two centuries.27  He further contrasted the state of English 
beggars with southern slaves.  He also echoed northern abolitionist sentiments that had an 
air of racism to them as “educated” free blacks were the only ones who could rise above 
vagrancy and indolence.  This was a common sentiment among well-meaning 
abolitionists attempting to civilize blacks rather than commingle as equals.28  
The second point in closing was on matters of fairness between the states.  
Pinckney was still very much a unionist and, perhaps accurately, holding to the notion 
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that the expanse of American territory required a more decentralized governmental 
structure.  Here, the man who had thirty-three years before was as close a Hamiltonian 
figure as one could find among southern Framers, now praised strengthening state 
governments not only for the practical purposes of governance in a large territory but in 
order to maintain fairness among the states.  And what was good for Louisiana and 
Alabama was certainly good enough for Missouri.  Pinckney, again accurately, 
questioned what would become of the slaves and farms already established in the 
incipient state. 
Twice during the speech Pinckney drew on Swiss political scientist Emer de 
Vattel.  Vattel was well known, in French and English translations, among the 
Constitution’s Framers.  Both Washington and Franklin were among Vattel’s audience.  
Vattel’s magnum opus The Law of Nations was one of the Enlightenment’s first forays 
into forming an international law.  An over-simplification would be to label this treaty 
law.  The analogy here is striking especially from a devoted unionist like Pinckney.  The 
entire Missouri crisis would disrupt good faith relationships with the federal government 
akin to a treaty.  Madison had cautioned against such a rendering of the United States 
theory of union because of the nature of treaty law that Pinckney to which Pinckney 
would have presumably been familiar.  Abrogation necessarily entails dissolution of the 
union as a consequence.  The rhetoric here is equally striking.  Pinckney laid before the 
House a vision of the union and the wiles of factionalism and predictions for dissolution.  
Yet, perhaps without realizing it, he treated the country’s unifying principal as no more 
than a treaty.  The analogy is flawed but in territorial matters not entirely imperfect.  How 
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could a state accept statehood on terms different than another? Why should Missouri 
capitulate on the matter of slavery when Louisiana did not? 
Just as other congressmen would invoke Europe during the Missouri crisis, 
Pinckney believed that Europe was awaiting not only America’s dissolution but awaited 
bad faith negotiating over Missouri as a sign of the United States’ own bad faith treaty 
making internationally.  Of equal interest to the question of the nature of the states among 
themselves was the nature of the country to its territories.  If Missouri was not admitted 
as a state what would its status be? Could it simply break away and form its own 
independent country?  Here, Pinckney was perhaps most prescient.  Would the United 
States then take up arms to secure the statehood on the North’s preferred terms and, if it 
did, would Missourians’ fellow countrymen be willing to take up arms against their 
brothers?   
Pinckney’s shift in thought presaged the similar change of John C. Calhoun a 
decade later.  Indeed, Pinckney’s image of countrymen slaughtering their own was 
employed by Calhoun during the Nullification crisis questioning the value of a union held 
together at gunpoint.29  While Madison stayed largely silent on Missouri, Jefferson busily 
pumped his fears of disunion over Missouri into the minds of those who approached him 
for comment.  The intent of these letters have been interpreted as overwrought but 
predicting disunion had the benefit of creating the urgency for compromise.  The growing 
disaffection following the War of 1812 in Republican-held Maine allowed for such a 
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compromise to take place.30  Although, in his correspondence with Pinckney, Jefferson 
alleged the entire scandal was a Federalist ruse.31 
Pinckney is an almost too-useful face for this transitional period between before 
the Jacksonian age.  He, like Jefferson, believed in union although both sowed rhetorical 
seeds that would undermine it in the years to come.  Yet, Pinckney’s arguments about 
apportionment, the nature of union, acting in good faith in a federal system, and his 
exposition of the terms migration and importation were not necessarily false.  Pinckney 
was a vocal and engaged member of the Constitutional Convention along with his cousin 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney.  Pinckney tried to protect southern interests by tilting 
toward a more Jeffersonian bent than he had been in 1787 but without entirely 
abandoning the idea of a harmonious union.  The clamor of abolition was not, for 
Pinckney, a moral crusade although he did chip away at Biblical antislavery arguments in 
his House speech.  The clamor was instead an attempt to undermine southern parity in 
government.  Therefore, it was important to undermine the two strongest arguments 
Northern congressmen like Talmadge had: the three-fifths representation rule and the 
constitutional relationship between the federal government and the territories.  Who 
better to argue against this than the lone Framer in the House?  It is difficult to accept 
Pinckney’s correctness in the present for what it attempted to defend yet his arguments 
were quite sound and, frankly, practical in an age before mass communication and rail.  
Like Strong and Martin, Pinckney was in a unique circumstance to expound upon the 
Constitution he had helped to draft.   The compact world of the Framers was much more 
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diffuse by 1820.  The country in which Caleb Strong was more or less surrounded by no 
one but Founders and Framers had moved on and, as Pinckney made his speech in 1820, 
only thirteen of the original Framers remained.  Though overshadowed by Madison and 
Jefferson, Pinckney was the only one present in the House in 1820 to speak on the behalf 
of the founding document. 
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CHAPTER IV  
 
 
LUTHER MARTIN AND IMPLIED POWERS 
 
 
Luther Martin’s contribution to constitutional interpretation in the early republic 
was on the issue of implied powers.  Though a formidable legal mind frequently 
embroiled in high-profile cases, as well as a lengthy career as Maryland’s Attorney 
General, Martin’s greatest explication of implied powers came during the seminal 
Supreme Court case McCulloch v. Maryland.  Martin’s colorful persona is recorded in 
numerous sources.  Regrettably, perhaps his greatest rhetoric in McCulloch is known only 
through John Marshall’s decision which was as far removed from Martin’s point of view 
as any decision could have been. 
Martin was born in New Jersey to a poorer family.  Through the support his father 
and older brothers he left as an adult to study at the College of New Jersey.  It was there 
he made the acquaintance of future convention delegate, and ideological foe, Oliver 
Ellsworth of Connecticut.1 Later he worked as a schoolteacher and then moved to 
Williamsburg, Virginia to practice law.  Surviving letters indicate that James Madison 
had at least a passing knowledge of Martin as early as 1772.2 George Washington 
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mentions Martin and his wife in a letter in 1785.3  Martin met his wife, Sarah Cresap, in a 
story he relates in Modern Gratitude during his time in Virginia.  When the pair first met, 
she was still a minor.  Martin’s devotion to his in-laws would reach a fever pitch toward 
the end of the century. 
 Martin had been present in key pre-war meetings in Annapolis and afterward at 
the Annapolis Convention in 1786.  He joined William Paca and Samuel Chase in calling 
for Maryland’s independence.  He served as Maryland’s Attorney General from 1777 to 
1805 and was reappointed in 1818.  Martin’s credentials notwithstanding, he was not the 
first pick of Maryland’s House of Delegates for the Constitutional Convention.  Most of 
Maryland’s leading politicians declined the offer.  Two of Maryland’s delegates, Daniel 
of St. Thomas Jenifer and Daniel Carroll were part of Maryland’s powerful aristocracy.  
Luther Martin, despite his position and prestige, and his Anti-Federalist cohort John 
Francis Mercer, were not part of that stratum.4 
 Martin was a few days late to the convention.  He sat waiting for days before 
speaking.  He did not represent his home state’s interests particularly well.  Martin, 
among other leading Anti-Federalists, believed that the convention had been called to 
amend the Articles of Confederation.  Discovering that they were called to overhaul the 
entire American government and draft a new constitution struck them as a monarchical 
plot.5  Martin assailed the convention.  He saw himself, as Mel Bradford noted, not as a 
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founder but as a preserver of the Articles.6 Martin’s speeches were described as long-
winded although, in sum, he was no more verbose than Gouverneur Morris, perhaps the 
most frequent speaker at the convention. 
 Martin and Mercer stood in stark contrast to Jenifer and Carroll.  Maryland’s 
government, at least until the end of the century, was one of the most conservative in the 
Americas.  The Senate was rigidly aristocratic.  The House was not much better, but what 
few major proposals percolated from the House were usually thwarted by the Senate.  
This included paper money bills for which Martin, frequently in debt himself, supported 
much to the embarrassment of his Federalist colleagues.7  Martin’s sentiments rested with 
states righters and the have-nots of society.  Maryland land speculators had huge holdings 
in Appalachia.  In addition to the barrier the Articles had been to taxation, and to defense, 
giving up land rights in the West was hardly tenable to Maryland speculators.8   
 Sensing a doomed battle at the convention, Martin attempted to wrest as many 
concessions as he could from more nationalistic delegates.  At the end, despite his 
victories in persuasion, Martin clashed with Jenifer with the former stating that he would 
be hanged before Maryland accepted the nationalistic Constitution.  Jenifer sarcastically 
warned Martin to stay in Philadelphia if that were the case.9  Robert Yates and John 
Lansing of New York left the convention in protest.  They, like Martin, stated that they 
believed their original purpose was to revise the Articles of Confederation.10  Yates’ 
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notes of the convention became much more important later on.  Lansing preserved Yates’ 
notes.11   
 Understanding convention custom is neglected but absolutely essential to 
understanding the behaviors of some Anti-Federalist delegates in 1787 and in studying 
other conventions before and after.12 The Constitutional Convention was one of a long 
line of conventions that had taken place since the mid-1760s to attempt confederation 
between the disparate states.  Conventions had their own legal jargon and operated within 
certain guidelines.  This format was present in the Annapolis Convention, the convention 
at Philadelphia, and even the Hartford Convention (the third convention to bear that 
name) in 1814.  Conventions operated on certain protocols and largely off custom.  They 
could be “general” or “partial” in scope or unlimited (plenipotentiary convention).  
However, the state sending delegates (never legislators) could amend the commission as 
New York had.  In this archaic legal custom Martin, Lansing, Mercer, and Yates were 
correct that their commissions did not allow them to do anything but amend the Articles.  
For Lansing and Yates the commission was specific; Martin and Mercer bent the 
language of the Maryland commission to suit their purposes.  Similarly, Hamilton was 
working far outside the scope of the commission he shared with Lansing and Yates.  
 One of Martin’s notable accomplishments was the supremacy clause.  This may 
seem a strange position for an ardent Anti-Federalist devoted to the preservation of state 
sovereignty but pulling back there is a broader context.  Madison, Hamilton, and other 
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delegates had favored broad oversight of state legislature activity at the national level.  
This would have included a veto over state legislation.  Charles Pinckney and James 
Madison favored the action.  Roger Sherman was not opposed as long as there were only 
certain instances in which the veto could be applied.  Pierce Butler, Pinckney’s peer from 
South Carolina, was vehemently opposed along with George Mason and Luther Martin.13 
Martin, who had also been incensed at the Virginia Plan’s subordination of smaller states, 
was equally galled by the threat of Congressional usurpation of state-level prerogatives. 
 Charles Pinckney’s mysterious draft of the Constitution also had such a veto in 
place.  Martin’s fellow Anti-Federalist, Lansing, also demurred.  On June 15, William 
Paterson proposed a version of the supremacy clause.14  An early draft of the Constitution 
from the Committee of Style also uses the clause.  This seems to have been written close 
to the final draft approved in September.  During Martin and Ellsworth’s Landholder 
exchanges early the following year, Ellsworth charged that Martin had originated the 
supremacy clause.  Martin did not deny the charge stating in his March 1788 reply that it 
was a compromise maneuver to dodge the power of congressional veto that he, Anti-
Federalists, and Federalists alike disapproved.15  Martin would find the clause turned 
against him thirty-two years later. 
 One point on which states’ rights advocates and Federalists coincided was on the 
power of the judiciary.  After McCulloch, charges against the role and activism of the 
Supreme Court would have seemed foreign to the Framers whom the neo-antifederalists 
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and fire-eaters summoned as authorities on the limited role of government.  Framers 
wavered in their support of the support of the role of a judiciary. 
The role of the courts was the subject of vigorous debate following the 
Revolution.16  The period from 1788-1803 was critical for the development of American 
judicial review doctrine.  Anti-Federalists, for all their disapproval of consolidation and 
federal overreach, were overwhelmingly in favor of the Court.  Framers as ideologically 
distinct as Oliver Ellsworth and George Mason approved of the judiciary although their 
model judiciary was not necessarily a branch of government distinct from the 
Executive.17 Elbridge Gerry was the first to demur from an aligned Executive and 
Judiciary preferring a “guardian of the rights of the people” to rest within the legislative 
branch.  Gerry’s colleague, Caleb Strong, tersely disagreed; making and clarifying law 
were two separate roles.18 
Luther Martin interjected, arguing that the judiciary should be a separated third 
branch of government with the right to judge the constitutionality of laws as well as the 
right to nullify them.  Now, it was unclear whether Martin intended this adjudication to 
be for federal laws only or also to the state.  George Mason’s reply that judges should be 
given greater authority to be a negative on any improper law implied that Martin was 
taking a middle course.  Anti-Federalists differed on the appointment of these judges, but 
there seemed to be little disagreement in the role of a federal judiciary only its 
compartmentalization.19 Mason’s views were far ahead of their time although he had 
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Federalist peers at the convention who wanted nullification of state laws to reside in the 
legislative branch.  Luther Martin agitated for what became the supremacy clause in a 
compromise to avoid granting federal supremacy but avoiding giving it broad powers 
over state lawmaking.20 
The diversity of opinions reflected the new country’s split sentiments over the 
role of the judiciary.  Judicial review was required in some state constitutions, like 
Kentucky, but expressly forbidden in others, like Pennsylvania.  Ohio impeached two 
judges in 1807 and 1808 for declaring state legislative acts void.  German and Swiss 
courts, whom Martin and other Anti-Federalists endorsed as models of government, did 
not necessary annul cantonal laws but no law could conflict with confederation law.  
Judicial review evolved in the states and soon enough Pennsylvania had created the 
reasonable doubt criterion by which a judiciary could nullify a state law.21 
While Marbury is frequently credited with establishing a national precedent of 
judicial review, it might not have reached the same level of contention as a state level 
case did Maryland’s Whittington v. Polk.  Maryland, once so rigidly conservative and 
Federalist was not immune to the Jeffersonian shellacking in 1801.  Martin’s fellow 
Marylander and Anti-Federalist, John Francis Mercer, rose as governor and Republicans 
took both houses of the legislature.  In a case very similar to Marbury, Whittington saw a 
Federalist judge suing for his old seat in Maryland.22 The new Republican dominated 
                                                          
     20 Obrecht, 280. 
     21 James B. Thayer, “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,” 
Presentation at the Congress on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, Chicago, IL, August 9, 1893. 
     22 Jed Handelsman Shugerman, “Marbury and Judicial Deference: The Shadow of Whittington v Polk 
and the Maryland Judiciary Battle,” Journal of Constitutional Law 5, no. 1 (October 2002), 59.  Douglas 
Edlin also argues that judicial review had a lengthy common law basis in colonial governments through 
post-ratification.  One pre-Marbury case he cites was Jones v. The Commonwealth in Virginia which was 
decided on constitutional (it was before Marbury but after ratification of the Bill of Rights) and common 
law grounds. See Douglas E. Edlin, “Judicial Review Without a Constitution,” Polity 38, no. 3 (July 2006), 
73 
 
legislature had stripped the 1796 Maryland judiciary law to create new space for 
friendlier judicial appointments.  
Whittington received more national attention in 1801 than Marbury in 1803.  
Marbury, often elevated to a turning point in historical myth-making, did not raise nearly 
the same ire. Both decisions maintained judicial independence during the Jeffersonian 
onslaught while simultaneously restraining judicial scope.23  Even Marbury’s aggrieved 
defendant, James Madison, mentioned it infrequently in contemporaneous writings.24 
Maryland electoral politics was a complicated morass in which judges often served as 
state electors for presidential elections in ways that would alarm contemporary voters.  
Maryland ousted ideologically disharmonious judges including William Whittington.  
Whittington’s counsel included Robert Goodloe Harper and Jeffersonian foe Luther 
Martin.25  
The case was not decided in Whittington’s favor, much to Martin’s alarm.  The 
case fell under judicial purview, but the state Supreme Court would not go as far as to 
declare the acts void.  This decision set the stage for what James Bradley Thayer 
identified in Origin and Scope as the foundation of American judicial review.  The 
question at stake must be substantial enough to warrant judicial intervention.26 
Implied powers have a complicated path in American constitutional history.  The 
origin of the necessary and proper clause is unclear from the surviving records.  
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Randolph rejected the clause.  Elbridge Gerry likewise rejected its inclusion stating that it 
would be the “general power of the legislature to make what laws they please . . .” This 
sentiment was echoed in Rufus King’s notes on the convention.  George Mason likewise 
thought the clause was a catchall.27  There is an irony here.  While Luther Martin would 
later attempt to argue that the clause’s purpose was limited to only the execution of 
enumerated powers, it seems clear that many of his Anti-Federalist peers thought 
otherwise.  Martin never mentioned the clause in General Information or in other 
documents.   
 However, the furor over the clause persisted into the state-level ratification 
debates.  Alexander Hamilton was the first to answer the charges in January 1788’s 
Federalist 33.  Hamilton tethered the necessary and proper clause to the supremacy 
clause.  Hamilton did not think the clause was necessary; a sentiment Marshall used 
verbatim in McCulloch.  However, where Marshall was more conservative in his defense 
of the Clause, perhaps deliberately so as will be explained below, Hamilton was more 
forceful.  For Hamilton, the threat of state usurpation of national authority was a greater 
threat to be thwarted by the two clauses.  It was the state’s parsimony over constitutional 
construction that Hamilton wanted to avoid.  Strict Constructionism was a dragon 
Hamilton intended to slay in its infancy.28 
 Hamilton’s fears were well founded.  Six months later, Hamilton faced Luther’s 
peers in the New York.  Among the most difficult opponents of ratification were John 
Lansing, who had walked out of the convention, Thomas Tredwell, and Gilbert 
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Livingston.  Tredwell’s comments occupy a large portion of Elliot’s Debates notes on 
New York’s ratification.  Tredwell attempted to restrict the meaning of the necessary and 
proper clause to only those powers “expressly given.”  These were undoubtedly among 
the notes Luther H brought to his arguments in McCulloch along with the Virginia 
ratification debate from which he quoted the Chief Justice’s own limited government 
sentiments in 1788.29  John Jay joined Hamilton in defense of the new document.   
 The vote in New York was dangerously close at 30-27.  New York was not 
necessary to meet the nine-state threshold for ratification, but it was an important state.  
Alexander Hamilton, and the realities of ratification, swayed enough delegates to change 
their votes.  Lansing and Tredwell voted against ratification while another faction of 
Anti-Federalists, inexplicably, and perhaps fortuitously, abstained.   
 The situation in Maryland was far different for Luther Martin who, like Lansing, 
had returned home with John Francis Mercer to defeat ratification.  Maryland’s 
ratification vote, Luther’s convention bluster notwithstanding, was perhaps more of a 
given than any other state.  Maryland’s vote, despite Martin’s long-winded rhetoric, 
voted 67-11 in favor of ratification.   
 Maryland’s vote was critical.  Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, 
Connecticut, and Massachusetts had ratified in two months.  South Carolina and 
Virginia’s votes were uncertain.  New Hampshire had adjourned without a decision.  
Rhode Island and North Carolina were determined not to ratify.  Indeed, it would be over 
two years before Rhode Island joined the Union.  The strong Anti-Federalist contingents 
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in Virginia and New York were seeking a mandate and were close to getting one if 
Maryland failed to ratify.  The situation elicited the concern of Madison, Jefferson, and 
Washington.30 
 Federalist sentiment rang strong in Maryland.  Newspapers and pamphleteers took 
to the presses to encourage support for ratification.  Martin and other Anti-Federalists 
hoped for a similar adjournment to New Hampshire’s pending a vote in the more 
politically influential Virginia.  He also responded to Maryland Federalists in a series of 
publications aimed primarily at a working class audience.  These did not have the sway 
he had hoped.  Martin and other anonymous Anti-Federalists seemed too alarmist 
claiming that the Senate would seize power, the government would suspend habeas 
corpus, and a list of other hypothetical scenarios of nationalist power grabs.31 
 Ultimately, Harford and Baltimore counties elected Anti-Federalist delegates.  All 
other counties were predominantly Federalist.  In all, twelve Anti-Federalist delegates 
attended the ratification convention.  As noted, this was insufficient to thwart ratification 
and Maryland became the seventh state to ratify in what Washington and others hoped 
would be a domino effect to bring Virginia and New York Anti-Federalists to heel and 
gain the requisite nine states for final adoption. 
Martin’s views on the clause were not unlike his Anti-Federalist peers in New 
York.  Marshall summed up Martin’s arguments in McCulloch as actually restrictive.  “In 
support of this proposition, they have found it necessary to contend that this clause was 
inserted for the purpose of conferring on Congress the power of making laws.”32  
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Marshall retorted, “would it have entered into the mind of a single member of the 
convention than an express power to make laws was necessary to enable the legislature to 
make them?”33 
 Marshall exercised restraint here; more than what was immediately obvious 
although Marshall did dismiss Luther’s constitutional literalism.  Any text in its most 
rigorous and literal reading would deliver a different meaning than intended.  Marshall 
listed cases where the government had broad powers that were not enumerated in the 
Constitution specifically.  What was proper and what was necessary were distinct 
questions.  In Marshall’s phrasing, “let the end be legitimate.”  Necessity was a 
legislative determination.  Propriety belonged more to the judiciary.34   
 Hamilton and Madison had both grappled with the clause as it related to the First 
Bank of the United States in 1791.  Hamilton wrote to President Washington in his 
capacity as Secretary of Treasury opposing the counsel of Jefferson, who had replaced 
John Jay as Secretary of State, and Edmund Randolph as Attorney General.  Interestingly, 
while not an Anti-Federalist, Randolph, like Martin and Lansing, had refused to sign the 
final Constitution.  Madison, having secured ratification in Virginia, was serving in the 
House of Representatives. 
 Hamilton, speaking for the Framers, spoke more so for himself.  Ultimately, he 
successfully convinced Washington to sign the banking bill.  Hamilton’s lengthy letter 
made no distinction between implied or enumerated powers.  As Hamilton noted early in 
the letter, the convention’s intent was to grant broad latitude toward the execution of all 
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powers, enumerated or otherwise.  The clause “ought to be constructed liberally in 
advancement of the public good.” 
 Hamilton addressed Randolph and Jefferson’s arguments point-by-point although, 
toward the end, his argument was clearly from utility.  Hamilton cited the example of war 
during which easy money was necessary for victory.  Hamilton, like Marshall, was 
acutely aware of the financial and logistical complications that plagued the Revolution.35   
 While Hamilton had no compunctions about blurring the line between 
“necessary” and “expedient,” Madison clearly sought to distinguish the two.  Madison 
was uninterested as a legislator in the political outcomes of these experiments but their 
constitutionality.  Madison did not resort to turning the Constitution into a lengthy legal 
code (as Marshall warned strict construction and enumerated powers would), but stated 
that the Constitution’s wording left only strict construction as the proper interpretation.  
Madison referred to the Bill of Rights, which were making their way through state 
ratification in early 1791.36  Barnett emphasizes that Madison’s definition of necessary 
matched Jefferson’s who, in his own address to Washington, stated that the clause only 
applied to enumerated powers.37 
 Madison and Hamilton’s differences set the rhetorical stage for McCulloch.  John 
Marshall, while keeping the veneer of a detached judiciary ultimately had to wax 
political, at least in action.  Marshall could not adopt the broad latitude of Hamilton nor 
was he willing to subscribe to the strict construction Luther Martin exposited.  By 1819, 
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even Madison and Jefferson had employed the bank in their presidencies.  Martin’s 
arguments seemed hopelessly archaic. 
Marshall’s decision attempted to draw his own interpretation toward the center 
and cast Martin and the bank’s opponents as the radicals.  Marshall took a similar tack 
that was seen in Whittington.  Whittington established the constitutionality of judicial 
review but limited its scope to cases with extraordinary stakes.  McCulloch was similar in 
that it did not assert a Hamiltonian vision of the necessary and proper clause.  Marshall’s 
dispassion was well placed.  Had this been any other case involving similar elements – 
rather than a banking case on the coattails of the Panic of 1819 – it might not have 
elicited the response that it had.  Even legally, the case had not been anything new.  In 
U.S. v. Fisher in 1805, Marshall had already established the view of the necessary and 
proper clause that he employed in McCulloch, which involved matters of national debt 
collection.38 
McCulloch served as the galvanizing event for neo-antifederalists.  Marshall’s 
emotional detachment from the case would not last.  Marshall and Virginia jurist, 
Spencer Roane, engaged in heated debates over McCulloch and the right of judicial 
review in the Virginia Enquirer.  Marshall had long attempted to distinguish between 
legal and political concerns – this was much to Luther Martin’s delight when Marshall 
subpoenaed documents from President Jefferson during Aaron Burr’s trial.39 Luther 
Martin seemingly vanished from the scene although both Roane and John Taylor of 
Caroline would cite Martin as influences later on.  Roane attempted to solicit Jefferson 
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and Madison’s support for the neo-antifederalist cause.  Madison disliked the direction 
and scope of McCulloch but was no foe of judicial review, which he made clear to Roane.  
Madison’s judicial review ideology was limited, and originally tethered to the other 
branches in an advisory role.  As noted, Caleb Strong tersely objected to any attempt to 
make the judiciary a part of the other branches.  The attempts to recruit the Founding duo 
after McCulloch and during the Missouri crisis would foreshadow the attempts to do the 
same during the Nullification crisis a decade later.   
As the 1820s faded into the 1830s, James Madison was lone survivor of the 
convention.  John Lansing mysteriously vanished in 1829.  William Few died in 1828.40  
Monroe, Madison’s closest friend, died in 1831 mourning that he could not see Madison 
at least once more.  The rise of the Jackson Democrats and southern states’ rights 
ideology sought to place their roots in the convention.  The next great constitutional crisis 
was John C. Calhoun’s supposed nullification of the 1828 tariff in South Carolina.  This 
was the same Calhoun who had once formerly supported greater nationalistic policies and 
had faced disappointment when President Madison refused to sign his Bonus Bill.   
 South Carolina politics had changed from the days of Pinckneys and Rutledges.  
A new breed of politician, the fire-eaters, had begun their ascendance.  Whether John C. 
Calhoun’s ideological shift arose from political realities in South Carolina or genuine 
reconsideration of his ideas is a matter of debate.  Calhoun had an estimable and capable 
mind and claimed as progenitors the Framers, especially Jefferson.  By 1832, Madison 
was alone to face down this last constitutional crisis. 
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 Calhoun cited the Spirit of ’98, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, as his 
historical precedent for nullification.  Jefferson died in 1826.  Madison stood vehemently 
against any sort of state veto of national laws.  He had, in fact, been an early supporter of 
the opposite flow of power, which had rankled Luther Martin and led him to triangulate 
at the convention to pull the germinal supremacy clause from the New Jersey Plan and 
give it primacy in the final draft of the Constitution.  Tragically, Madison found himself 
on the receiving end of scorn and jokes because of his stance.  As the Founding 
generation was more or less gone, the compunctions about delivering insult to them, even 
to someone of Madison’s stature, were lost.41 
 Although Jefferson survived as the iconic Founder for the neo-antifederalists, 
Luther Martin had also endured in their collective memory.  Calhoun’s Exposition speech 
referenced Martin’s Genuine Information and the right of collecting duties on imports.  
Calhoun would have undoubtedly had access to Yates’ notes on the convention, although 
considered wrong by Madison, which included information on Luther Martin.  Luther’s 
radical notions of state sovereignty, as a preserver of the Articles, would have appealed 
more than James Wilson’s divided sovereignty, or especially Hamiltonian notions of 
federal supremacy. 
 John Quincy Adams, never ideologically harmonious with Martin, nonetheless 
admired him.  In the closing statements of the Amistad case in 1841, Adams referred to 
Martin as an opponent but “a brilliant luminary, so long the pride of Maryland and the 
American bar.”  Adams listed several retired and deceased American lawyers.  Adams 
indicated his own retirement from public life although he lived to 1848. 
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 Both John Archibald Campbell and Samuel Nelson, a John Tyler appointee to the 
Supreme Court, cited Martin as an authority in Dred Scot in 1854.  Alexander Stephens A 
Constitutional View of the Late War also cited Stephens at least five times as a Framer 
more to his ideological liking.  Similarly, Jefferson Davis’s The Rise and Fall of the 
Confederate Government cited Secret Proceedings and Luther Martin.  Less than a 
decade later, Campbell’s interview in Federal Bull-Dog on Martin appeared as well as 
Roger Taney’s autobiography. 
 Martin appears in various other documents through the turn of the century.  
Bernard Steiner’s history of Maryland’s ratification, cited here, in 1899 resurrected 
Martin’s memory as well.  Confederate Veterans May 1908 issue also elevated him as a 
states’ rights champion perhaps, in some way, shoehorning Martin into the realm of Lost 
Cause mythos.   
In broader strokes, Martin was as indefatigable and contrarian in 1819 as he had 
been in 1787.  He was, in 1787, a preserver of the Articles adhering to his commission as 
a convention delegate.  In 1819, he was the expositor of a Constitution that still embodied 
those basic ideas of state sovereignty.  He was on less sound textual ground in 1819.  
Martin advocated not only for state sovereignty that might have been more appropriate in 
the Articles but also against the use of implied powers whether they were as far-reaching 
as Hamilton’s notions or as limited as Marshall’s.   
 When Charles Pinckney criticized the Missouri Compromise his exposition of the 
Constitution, on apportionment and slavery, were rooted in intense sectionalism.  
Pinckney’s interpretation of the 1808 clause, as well as slave representation in 
apportionment, was discussed at length at the convention.  Similarly, Martin’s ideas 
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about implied powers and state sovereignty were given their due consideration at the 
convention.  Neither man was necessarily wrong, and both had formidable influence on 
the final document, although Pinckney fought to ratify against difficult odds as Martin 
fought against ratification despite an overwhelming majority in favor of the new 
document. 
 Granted both were in positions of power in which their constitutional expositions 
made political sense.  Martin represented Maryland and its right to tax as Maryland’s 
attorney general.  Pinckney represented South Carolina’s slaveholding interests in the 
House of Representatives.  To that end, their ideas about the document they helped to 
draft were necessary as representatives of their state and its electorate.  However, their 
stances had not changed, or changed very little, since 1787.  This indicates a deeper 
adherence to principle.   
 Both men saw a threat in the growing national government as many of their peers 
did in 1787.  Charles Pinckney, Luther Martin, and Caleb Strong had lived long enough 
beyond the convention to see just how far the new government could extend itself into 
the affairs of individuals and indeed the world.  They had seen what their own peers had 
done in their roles as Presidents of the new country.  It was the supplanting of the wills of 
smaller men and institutions and the supposition of a national will and telos.  This was a 
process that would have incited fear in the Founding generation and did so in its 
surviving members in the 1820s.  Therefore, while there were the elements of 
sectionalism and state interest in the arguments of Strong, Pinckney, and Martin there 
was also genuine fear of the direction their experiment had taken.  Each had a hand in 
writing the Constitution but were charged with the leadership and representation of a 
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particular state (Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Maryland) when the questions of 
constitutional crises emerged.  How Jefferson or Madison would have dealt with the 
constitutional questions at the national level would invariably be different than how 
someone operating at the state-level would answer those questions regardless of their 
involvement in drafting the Constitution.  Madison and Jefferson had done no different in 
1798.   
Luther Martin died July 10, 1826, four days following Thomas Jefferson and 
James Adams.  His letters in 1821 attest that he at least maintained some of his 
intellectual faculties as late as that year.  The Maryland legislature passed a unique bill 
calling for a portion of each legislator’s salary to be given as a makeshift old age pension 
to Martin.  Although Martin’s younger brother, Lenox, worked in Baltimore as a lawyer, 
he was taken in by Aaron Burr in New York. 
 In his dotage, Martin was known to walk into court in Baltimore and sit before the 
judge.  Judges simply recessed out of respect to the man.  In New York, Martin’s style of 
dress was considered an anachronism in the early 1820s as he strolled about seemingly 
clueless to his surroundings.  The Manhattan borough documented his death, interestingly 
giving an age that hints at an earlier birth than the typically given 1748.  His cause of 
death was rather imprecisely listed as “old age.”  There is a tiny star next to Martin’s 
name on the deaths register as if to indicate a footnote.  In the remarks next to the 
sexton’s name, the administrator said simply “a celebrated lawyer.”42 
 Martin’s reputation is often lost in the present although it was never questioned in 
his own time.  He represented the past and its ideas even in his own present.  He argued 
                                                          
     42 Deaths Register, Manhattan Borough, city of New York, 1826. 
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forcefully, perhaps dogmatically, for a government that his contemporaries saw 
hopelessly ineffective.  Barring the reformation of the Articles, Martin argued for an 
interpretation of the Constitution that Marshall, and others, saw as a fiction.  However, as 
far as the antebellum South was concerned, Martin was more ahead of his time than 
behind it.  Jefferson might have been the celebrity figurehead among southern states 
rightists, but their truest ideological forebear was Luther Martin.  It is fitting that Martin’s 
role in this school of thought remains so understated.  He downplayed his own 
involvement in the Constitution’s formation though perhaps out of his frustration with the 
document than genuine humility. 
 Yet the “real” Luther Martin would never neatly fit in the mold of a southern 
states’ rightist either.  He deplored slavery, opposed Jeffersonian principles, and 
discharged what he believed to be his commission from the state of Maryland at the 
Constitutional Convention.  Decades later during McCulloch, he restated his own 
principles to a government more frequently hostile to them.  Those friendly to his ideas 
would not have been as ideologically harmonious with Martin as they might have 
believed.  To see in Martin, or other Anti-Federalists, an “original” intent is simply an 
instance of confirmation bias and borne of expedience when appealing to national 
memory in works of persuasion.  A more objective treatment of Martin’s ideas and 
character is far more interesting and reveals the mind of the man who was so greatly 
respected by his peers as far-flung ideologically as John Quincy Adams and Roger 
Taney. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Evaluating the actions of these men in the past runs the risk of presentism.  Those 
in the present are fortunate to have information and insight not necessarily available to 
their forebears.  Even more difficult for Caleb Strong, Charles Pinckney, and Luther 
Martin, and their many peers was the uniqueness of their situation from 1787 to 1821.  
The word “interpretation” must give way in some circumstances to “invention.”  Try as 
many did to find precedent or parallel for the American situation, it was not always 
possible to do so.   
 Federalists tended to look toward England, Luther Martin toward the Swiss 
Confederation, and others still to the Dutch Low Countries for inspiration.1 Those who 
looked toward England had the example of the Acts of Union which established a 
structure of two parliaments under a single crown for England and Scotland.  Alison 
LaCroix rightfully points out the error in treating the Constitutional Convention as time 
zero in the story of American federalism.  Not only does that history extend before 1787 
but across geographic boundaries as well.  The question is who understood that point in 
1787.2 
                                                          
     1 Hutson, The Sister Republics, 27. 
     2 LaCroix, Origins of American Federalism, 7. 
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 James Madison best understood the unusual nature of the new republic in 1787.  
Madison’s impressive education at Princeton was steeped in political philosophy.  John 
Adams’ Harvard education was geared toward his development as a minister and future 
political leader.  Adams later defended a thesis on government before beginning his 
career in law.  It is no exaggeration that Madison and Adams were perhaps the best read 
in political science and keen on its application.  Caleb Strong was a Cantibrigian like 
Adams and Luther Martin a Princetonian like Madison, but neither had the same 
exposure to political theory even if they were, by surviving accounts, very well read in 
Coke, Littleton, and other famous legal scholars.  Here the Constitution may be divided 
into two categories: a political document and a legal document. 
 Strong would have recognized the nature of the union as Madison saw it.  Had 
individual legislators ratified the constitution, rather than conventions, the new document 
would have had the force of a treaty; one that abrogated by any of the parties would have 
rendered it non-binding on all the others.  This also placed the repeal of such an act back 
in the hands of the legislatures.3 The designs for a northern confederacy were likely 
concocted without the input of Strong, Rufus King, or other Federalist Framers.4 While 
the idea of disunion was an acceptable one in theory, its application was considered ill-
conceived.  Strong made clear his disapproval in his 1804 annual address to the 
Massachusetts legislature. 
 This disapproval was not necessarily a legal one.  A radically state-centered 
interpretation of the Constitution would have made the action acceptable.  Politically, 
                                                          
     3 McDonald, States’ Rights, 21. Letters from Pickering to King make it clear King did not approve. 
     4 McDonald, States’ Rights, 60-62. 
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without New York as a ballast, the proposal would have been legally arguable but 
politically disastrous.  Sounder and less doctrinaire minds, like Strong’s, prevailed.  This 
was not ground in political theory but was more a pragmatic stance.  None of Luther 
Martin’s surviving documents hint at a favorable attitude toward disunion despite his 
vehement opposition to ratification.  However, given his estimable legal mind, Martin 
could have persuasively argued for it.  Martin’s legalistic, rather than political, worldview 
never permitted the legitimacy of the Constitutional Convention or the nine-thirteenths 
ratification threshold for the Constitution to be binding on all states. 
 Pinckney is an interesting case since the Pinckney of 1787 and of 1820 would 
hardly recognize one another’s politics.  He became the champion of slavery as a positive 
force at a time when an opinion from a lesser figure other than Framer, might have 
carried less weight.  Three-fifths representation was not good enough for Pinckney yet 
abhorrent to the Essex Junto seventeen years earlier.  Pinckney’s states’ rights was still a 
vision of national unity that casts doubt on the idea that he was thinking regionally. He 
stood on firmer ground than first appeared.  Pinckney also carried an understated amount 
of weight in the final draft of the Constitution and was more in line with Madison than 
the Anti-Federalists of the period.  Pinckney straddles the line between political and legal 
interpretation, but may be more appropriately in the realm of the political.  The moving 
away from conciliation to fractured regional and political identities led Pinckney to make 
a stand for the political reality that underlay the formation of the new republic.  It was not 
an answer suitable to his opponents or to those reading in the present.  Even if his 
arguments seem legalistic, federalism was the schema that allowed for coexistence of 
very different sets of states, histories, identities, and interests. 
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 As stated earlier, the complications of governing in a multi-layered government 
were new.  Although some Framers would try to draw parallels to other countries, 
including in Great Britain, these were not perfect analogies.  How a military would 
function in this new republic was uncertain and militia traditions were as varied as any 
other colonial institution.  How powers would be parsed in this multi-layered governing 
structure, and which layer could claim ownership to unspecified powers, were not easily 
answered.  And what would become of less savory institutions like slavery where 
regional opinions and moralities clashed?  The road to American federalism had a 
lengthy ideological background beginning as far back as Samuel von Pupendorf 
(LaCroix), Marilius of Padua or the Magna Carta (McDonald) or even over 800 years 
with the Althingi (Bradford).  LaCroix’s ideological history points to not only the nearer 
ideological background of Hobbes, Locke, Pupendorf, and Bodin but the early plans at 
unionizing, particularly Benjamin Franklin’s Albany Plan.5 
 Knowledge of this history and the ideology made better leaders and thinkers of 
some, like Madison and Adams. However, the institutional and practical work of 
federalism were better known to Strong, Martin, and Pinckney although all three were 
stepped in political philosophy as well.  For those swayed by states’ rights notions, the 
latter three Framers are far better friends than Madison, Adams, or Hamilton.  The 
electorate was the final arbiter of Strong’s ideas; the Federalists waned in power and 
Hartford became a national punchline. Martin’s ire over implied powers was, in his time, 
                                                          
     5 LaCroix, Origins of American Federalism, 25-8. 
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disassembled by John Marshall, but found currency in the South even if only a few knew 
Martin by name.  Pinckney’s question was ultimately settled at Appomattox.   
 As leaders these men were heavily influenced by what Gordon Wood identified as 
a gentlemanliness which emphasized public leadership. Many of the Framers and 
Founders were from humbler origins but sufficiently well-off to send their sons to 
universities; usually the first people in their families to do so.  There they were influenced 
by the ideals of the Enlightenment and the proper role for a gentleman and aristocratic 
leader.  George Washington, despite his untouchable public celebrity, often felt 
embarrassment for being unlettered and not fluent in a foreign language as his peers 
were.  In this sense, Caleb Strong was perhaps as much an image of this disinterested 
gentility as he was of an old-fashioned, Puritanical character.  Though perhaps not as 
lettered as Adams, he was nonetheless as much a product of this generation.6 Pinckney 
and Martin’s place in this world is not as certain; Pinckney was southern aristocracy and 
Martin, although the first one of his New Jersey family to attend university, was hardly 
gentlemanly in his behavior.  Martin stands as an outsider to this world, perhaps a 
testament to his placement in the middle of the South and North.  
 Of the three men, Strong perhaps used his membership at the convention the least 
although it likely contributed to his unrivaled popularity in Massachusetts.  The problem 
with singling out “forgotten” Founders and Framers is that it turns into an opportunity to 
resurrect figures who lack historical significance merely because of their presence at a 
major historical event, in this case the Constitutional Convention. That would be 
                                                          
     6 Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1993), 197-213. 
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hagiography. It also tries to treat a group of men collectively who cannot be categorized 
in any other way except in their joint membership at the convention. 
 Nevertheless, the textual evidence and participation in key events in the early 
republic give reason to re-consider these “forgotten” men, and reconsider how their 
participation at the convention and their understanding of the Constitution helped them to 
navigate the problems of the early republic.  There is no need to shoehorn Strong, Martin, 
or Pinckney into roles that are written to show more influence on events than they 
actually had.  It is possible to trace their palpable effects on the thinking on constitutional 
issues without over-exaggeration or attempting to elevate their status to that of Jefferson 
or Madison.  One need not have been a national figure to participate in constitutional 
crises in a way that warrants attention.  Their status as Framers, and their actions during 
questions involving the document they helped to draft, are important and have 
implications for history and law, particularly in times where constitutional interpretation 
could be based on expediency or political demagoguery.   
 Yet if a subtle affection creeps into writings about these men, it arises organically 
from the knowledge of what has transpired in constitutional thought since their time.  It is 
not judgement for their blunders or for their opinions that, in the present, seem immoral 
or dated.  It is admiration for the recklessness and hell-bent for leather willingness to 
assume roles that were incumbent on men of means and learning.  Assuming that role as 
a matter of duty, in spite everything they did know, and did not know, preceded as much 
from knowing the consequences of failure as they did from conviction.  Theirs was an 
awesome responsibility.  The historical record invariably loses information with time.  
This was an attempt to preserve as much information in the system about men who, like 
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many others preserved solely as names on a stele or parchment fragment, merited a 
greater space in our national memory. 
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